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PLANS AND POLICY

Implementation Of The Vienna Document 1992
Of The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures Convened In Accordance With The Relevant
Provisions Of The Concluding Document Of The Vienna
Meeting Of The Conference On Security and Co-operation
In Europe

1. Purpose. To prescribe policies, procedures, and responsibilities for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implementation of provisions of the Vienna Document 1992.
2. References. See Appendix A.
3. Explanation of the Vienna Negotiations. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), with the goal of building upon the experiences of the Stockholm Document and the Vienna Document 1990 (VDOC 90) to further improve the openness and transparency of military organizations and activities in Europe, continued negotiations in Vienna to improve the VDOC 90. The resulting agreement and successor to VDOC 90, the Vienna Document 1992 (VDOC 92), was signed by representatives of the forty-eight CSCE states on 4 March 1992 to take effect 1 May 1992. Since March 1992, Georgia, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have signed up to the provisions of the VDOC 92, bringing the CSCE membership to fifty-two states. This number was further increased to fifty-three by the formation of two separate states from the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. At the time of this revision, Yugoslavia had been suspended from participation. The zone of application of the VDOC 92 is the whole of Europe, east to the Ural Mountains, to include the adjoining sea area and airspace, and the non-European territory of the participating former Soviet republics, except Russia. The geographic areas and territorial possessions of Canada and the United States are not included.
4. Summary of VDOC 92 Provisions. Appendix C contains a detailed explanation of the VDOC 92 provisions. In general, participating states:

a. will conduct an annual exchange of information on military forces in the zone of application, on plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems, and on national military budgets and expenditures;

b. will develop and use a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature which threaten peace and stability in the zone of application;

c. will develop a program for periodic visits to military air bases in the zone, for increased contacts between military representatives of all other Parties, and for demonstrations of new types of weapon and equipment systems deployed within the zone.

d. will give written notice in an agreed format to all other Parties at least forty-two days in advance of notifiable military activities in the zone of application. Notifiable military activities include: land force activities of at least 9,000 troops or at least 250 battle tanks conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division; or an associated amphibious landing or parachute assault by airborne forces involving at least 3,000 troops;

e. will provide for observation of certain military activities by representatives of all Parties. Observable military activities include land force activities of at least 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks under a single operational command, engaged in the same activity, or an associated amphibious landing or parachute assault by airborne forces involving at least 3,500 troops;

f. will permit on-site inspections of geographic areas in the zone of application as requested by Parties to the VDOC 92, and evaluations to verify the information provided annually.

g. will submit detailed annual calendars depicting planned military activities subject to notification;

h. will provide 2-year notification of activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks and will not conduct activities of that size or greater unless 2-year notification has been given;

i. will implement programs for evaluation of exchanged information in accordance with VDOC 92 provisions;

j. will establish between CSCE capitals a system for direct communications related to these provisions;

k. will hold a meeting each year to assess ongoing and future implementation of VDOC 92.

5. Responsibilities.

a. JCS will (included for information only):

(1) represent the U.S. military in the U.S. Government (USG) interagency decisionmaking process;

(2) coordinate with the Services and establish U.S. military policy for implementation of provisions of the VDOC 92;

(3) provide policy guidance to USEUCOM and other affected commands, as required;

(4) serve as point of contact for issue resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the State Department (DOS);

(5) coordinate with OSD to ensure compliance with the VDOC 92 in the areas of seminars and the communications network;

(6) coordinate with and assist DOS to ensure compliance with the VDOC 92 in the areas of hazardous incidents, unusual military activities, visits to dispel concerns about military activities, and the annual implementation assessment meeting;

(7) plan, coordinate, and execute the exchange of military contacts with all other participating states;

(8) take overall responsibility for compliance with the VDOC 92 in the areas of annual exchange of military information, prior notification of certain military activities, annual calendars and constraining provisions, military contacts, visits to air bases, demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems, inspections, evaluations, and observations.

b. USCINCEUR will:

(1) establish and coordinate policy and procedures for implementation of the VDOC 92 provisions tasked to USEUCOM;

(2) obtain and compile data required on all VDOC 92 matters in theater. Specific areas requiring action are: USEUCOM service component information exchange input; annual calendar of notifiable activities; activity notifications; hosting observations, inspections, air base visits, and evaluations; and theater monitoring of East European and former Soviet military activities;

(3) compile and forward to the Joint Staff by 1 October of each year the information required for developing the annual calendar and forecast of notifiable military activities in the zone of application;

(4) provide the Joint Staff comprehensive information regarding notifiable activities NLT seventy days in advance of the activity start date (eighty days for REFORGER-related activities);

(5) provide information on any notifiable or observable U.S. activity already announced on the annual calendar which is to be scaled down below the respective threshold, as it may require the USG to publish an amended calendar;

(6) comply with the VDOC 92 in receiving foreign inspection and evaluation teams at U.S. activities and installations;

(7) cooperate with the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) in implementing escort and liaison requirements;

(8) execute the U.S. observer program for receiving and sending activity observers and air base visitors, as tasked by the Joint Staff, maintaining close coordination with the host state;

(9) conduct necessary liaison with MOD Bonn on annual calendars, activity notifications, hosting observations, and passive inspections/visits to ensure uniformity of action between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. This informal, ad hoc coordination will be accomplished as needed, and will not involve policy development;

(10) coordinate with other NATO nations to ensure parallel compliance with VDOC 92 provisions pertaining to U.S. forces based or training in those states, in accordance with applicable bilateral agreements.

c. USEUCOM component commands will meet specific requirements regarding annual calendars and forecasts, notifications, inspections, observations, evaluations, air base visits and other areas as indicated below. Component commands will provide written notice to HQ USEUCOM whenever changes to exercise plans are being formulated which involve an activity on the U.S. annual calendar or which might require a change or addition to the U.S. annual calendar. Within twelve hours after a request for inspection has been received by the host state, component commands will provide HQ USEUCOM information on out-of-garrison activity involving U.S. forces in the inspection specified area.

d. CINCUSAREUR, in addition to responsibilities in paragraph 5c above, will:

(1) provide HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3/ECJ5, and other USEUCOM component commands draft input for VDOC 92 annual calendars and forecasts, notifications, and changes, as required, for ground and airborne forces activities in the proper VDOC 92 formats;

(2) act on behalf of USEUCOM, as delegated by the host

state and agreed by the USG, to plan and conduct passive observations, to plan for and host passive inspections and evaluation visits for ground forces and airborne forces and activities, and to plan and conduct demonstrations of new ground forces weapon and equipment systems introduced into theater. In this capacity, direct coordination with the host state and OSIA-E is authorized, while keeping HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5-F, informed of significant actions. An after action report on each program implementation hosted by USAREUR will be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO 09128 within thirty days of completion of the observation program.

(3) provide advice and assistance to CINCUSNAVEUR, as requested, in the planning and conduct of observation programs for amphibious activities;

(4) provide support for OSIA liaison teams when activities which involve U.S. ground or airborne forces are being inspected. A USAREUR officer familiar with the activity and knowledgeable on the VDOC 92 will join the liaison team, when permitted.

(5) provide support for OSIA escort teams when U.S. ground or airborne forces are being evaluated.

e. CINCUSNAVEUR, in addition to responsibilities in paragraph 5c above, will:

(1) provide HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3/ECJ5 and other USEUCOM component commands draft input for VDOC 92 annual calendars and forecasts, notifications, and changes as required, for amphibious force activities according to the formats specified in the VDOC 92;

(2) act on behalf of USEUCOM, as coordinated with the host state and FMFEUR and agreed to by the USG, to plan for and conduct passive observations, evaluations, air base visits and demonstrations of newly fielded weapons systems and equipment for amphibious force and land-based naval aircraft activities. In this capacity, direct coordination with host state authorities is authorized, while keeping HQ USEUCOM informed of significant actions. An after action report on each program implementation will be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO 09128, within thirty days of completion of the observation program.

(3) provide support, as required, for OSIA liaison teams when activities which involve U.S. amphibious forces are conducted in a specified area undergoing inspection. When appropriate, HQ USNAVEUR will provide an officer familiar with the activity and knowledgeable on the VDOC 92 to join the liaison team.

f. CINCUSAFE, in addition to responsibilities in paragraph 5c above, will:

(1) provide information to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3/ECJ5 and other USEUCOM component commands concerning notifiable air activities which may be included in VDOC 92 annual calendars and forecasts, as well as notifications in the proper VDOC 92 formats;

(2) be prepared to assist OSIA in arranging transportation for inspectors, evaluators, and/or escort/liaison officers. OSIA will normally direct all intertheater requirements for flight operations support for VDOC 92 to the Air Mobility Command (AMC). European intratheater requirements will be worked between OSIA-E and the USEUCOM/Airlift Requirement Center (USEUCOM/ARC). Requirements for transporting U.S. inspectors will be scheduled quarterly by OSIA-Washington to AMC. Transportation requirements for U.S. escorts and liaison officers also will be filed directly with AMC (escort/liaison missions in Germany and the BENELUX will normally be accomplished by ground transportation). In the event circumstances prevent AMC from fulfilling support requirements for escort/liaison missions, OSIA will work through USEUCOM/ARC to determine alternative sources of support. USEUCOM/ARC will handle the request by normal procedures which include determining the availability of USAFE and USEUCOM transport as a last resort;

(3) act on behalf of USEUCOM, as coordinated with the host state and agreed to by the USG, to plan and conduct passive evaluations of air units and air base visits and demonstrations of newly fielded Air Force weapon systems and equipment in theater. In this capacity, direct coordination with host state authorities is authorized, while keeping HQ USEUCOM informed of significant actions. An after action report will be forwarded to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO 09128, within 30 days of completion of each program.

g. ECJ2 will:

(1) provide staff coordination on all VDOC 92 matters as requested by the Director, ECJ5;

(2) provide theater monitoring of former Soviet and other CSCE state activities, while acting as the conduit for intelligence information from national/theater sources in support of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) actions.

h. ECJ3 will:

(1) provide staff coordination on VDOC 92 matters as requested by the Director, ECJ5;

(2) arrange air transportation for U.S. observer teams travelling to and from programs hosted by other states in the event that commercial transportation is not available. If commercial air transportation is not available and AMC is unable to arrange MILAIR, ECJ3 will facilitate contact with USEUCOM/ARC

to determine airlift alternatives. When aircraft are available, the USEUCOM/ARC will coordinate support;

(3) develop and maintain Command Duty Officer (CDO) checklists to ensure prompt notification of appropriate HQ USEUCOM personnel/organizations, OSIA, and component command headquarters in the case of alert exercises requiring VDOC 92 reporting, impending on-site inspections, or other VDOC 92-related actions. USEUCOM component commands and OSIA will develop and maintain VDOC 92-peculiar point-of-contact telephone rosters to facilitate VDOC 92 reporting;

(4) coordinate with ECJ5-F to ensure draft VDOC 92 notifications and annual calendar information is submitted to the Joint Staff for U.S. and NATO coordination. Draft notification and annual calendar information will be prepared for all exercises or activities in which VDOC 92 notification criteria are likely to be met by U.S. forces and when U.S. forces will participate in Allied or NATO exercises which might exceed the notification threshold.

i. ECJ4 will:

(1) provide staff coordination on VDOC 92 matters as requested;

(2) consolidate, confirm, and submit to the Joint Staff by a mutually agreed date, but NLT the last work day prior to the start of the Annual Data Validation Conference each year, the required annual information exchange input from USEUCOM component commands, USLANTCOM, and other DOD reporting agencies.

j. ECJ5 will:

(1) act as HQ USEUCOM Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for VDOC 92 policy matters;

(2) provide theater guidance for submission of notifications and draft annual calendars and forecasts in the proper VDOC 92 formats or as agreed separately.

(3) upon receipt of draft calendar input and notifications from the component commands, and in coordination with ECJ3, co-ordinate with Allies, as appropriate, and forward USEUCOM input to the Joint Staff;

(4) provide guidance to component commands for planning of programs for hosting observation and evaluation activities;

(5) select, prepare, and debrief U.S. VDOC 92 observers and air base visitors; and

(6) coordinate with OSIA-Europe (OSIA-E) in planning and execution of the escort mission for U.S. units undergoing

inspections or evaluation visits.

k. ECPA will:

(1) coordinate public releases about USG participation in exercises with AMEMBASSY DAO and USIS, ECJ3, ECJ5, and other agencies, as required;

(2) coordinate public releases regarding inspections of U.S. installations or units with AMEMBASSY DAO and USIS, OSIA-E, HQ USEUCOM staff, and other agencies, as required. Where U.S. forces are collocated with host nation forces, public affairs responsibility will be retained by the host state. U.S. assistance may be provided, if requested. USDAOs in Allied countries should make this offer known to host states and advise HQ US-EUCOM-ECPA/ECJ5-F and OSIA-E; and

(3) provide public affairs guidance and contingency statements for use by AMEMBASSY, component commands, and subordinate units, as required. The following statement is provided to use in response to queries regarding CSCE inspection activities after coordination with the host state: "Inspections are an integral part of the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures agreed to in Vienna. The request of (nation) to conduct an inspection of (location) does not in any way indicate a crisis or heightening of tensions. Each CSCE state has agreed to give full cooperation to such requests, and we have been assured by (host nation) that inspectors from (nation) will be accorded full rights and privileges in accordance with the Vienna Document 92."

l. ECLA will provide legal guidance, as required, regarding the interpretation and implementation of the VDOC 92. ECLA will coordinate with DOD General Counsel and other legal offices as appropriate.

m. U.S. Defense Attache Offices, in accordance with reference A-2, will:

(1) provide observers to exercises, evaluators, or visitors to air base visits, as requested;

(2) support VDOC 92 inspections and evaluations by OSIA, as requested;

(3) provide support to the U.S. VDOC 92 liaison team when a host nation is undergoing a VDOC 92 inspection by Neutral/Non-Aligned or former Warsaw Pact states; and

(4) coordinate public affairs support in the host country as detailed in subparagraph 5.k. above.

6. Policies and Procedures. All actions to implement provisions of the VDOC 92 should reflect openness and transparency in the spirit of the agreement, keeping in mind appropriate measures to protect classified or sensitive information.

a. Annual Exchange of Military Information.

(1) As required by the VDOC 92, an exchange of detailed military information must be accomplished among the VDOC 92 participating states NLT 15 December of each year. In order to allow sufficient time for review, USEUCOM component commands and DoD reporting agencies will submit data to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ4, by noon on the Friday preceding Thanksgiving week in November of each year.

(2) USEUCOM component commands and reporting agencies will submit the information required in paragraph (10) through (15.4) of the VDOC 92 via the USAREUR-hosted Intratheater Treaty Support System (ITSS), the Conventional Arms Tracking System (CAATS), and the Data Management and Notification System (DM/NS) computer systems.

b. Air Base Visits. USEUCOM will conduct active and passive aspects of air base visit provisions of the VDOC 92. Active visits are those to which USEUCOM will send representatives; passive visits are those that USEUCOM will host. Each signatory state with air combat units reported in the information exchange is obligated to arrange at least one visit every five years to one of its normal peacetime air bases. The purpose of the air base visit is for representatives of the other signatory states to gain an appreciation of the number of sorties and types of missions being flown routinely.

(1) Active Air Base Visit.

(a) Invitations. Invitations will be delivered to CSCE states a minimum of forty-two days prior to the exercise. HQ USEUCOM will inform the component command headquarters sending visitors of the visit dates as soon as they are known. The USG will normally send two visitors to each air base visit hosted by another participating state. One visitor will normally be a member of the Defense Attache Office accredited to the country in which the air base visit occurs. USEUCOM nominates an officer for the second observer position. The Joint Staff reserves the option, however, to substitute a Joint Staff visitor for the USEUCOM nominee. Sending headquarters will ensure visitors have valid passports. Visitors will apply for visas from the embassy of the state in which the activity is to be observed, when such visas are required. Either tourist, official, or diplomatic passports may be used.

(b) Replies to invitations. Component commands will provide HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5-F the following personal data on their nominees when requested: name; rank; duty assignment; date/place of birth; passport number; place/date of issue (passport); travel arrangements to include airline, flight number, and time/place of arrival. ECJ5-F will forward the USEUCOM nominees to the Joint Staff in order to make the 21-day response time. Only the information on travel arrangements can be provided

outside the 21-day response time if unavailable at the time.

(c) Visitors from USEUCOM and USDAOs will be briefed by a HQ USEUCOM representative prior to the air base visit.

(d) Military visitors will wear the service dress uniform (Class A) during the visit activities.

(e) For active air base visits, the U.S. visit team to a participating state's air base will provide a written after action report to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO AE 09128 within seven days following the visit. This report should include, as a minimum, the following items: a visit itinerary; a list of participants, by state; summaries of visitor interests/questions and responses; administrative requests from the visitors; any issues requiring policy decisions; and items suitable for passage to the Joint Staff or State Department.

(2) Passive Air Base Visit.

(a) The decision to host a required U.S. air base visit will be reached in consultation with the State Department, the Joint Staff, HQ USEUCOM, and either HQ USAFE or HQ USNAVEUR. After U.S. decisions have been reached, the host state and NATO will be consulted.

(b) The responsibility for preparation and conduct of U.S.-hosted air base visit programs is delegated to the component commands: HQ USAFE will be responsible for the conduct of air base visit programs of USAFE activities; HQ USNAVEUR will be responsible for the conduct of air base visit programs of land-based naval air forces activities. USLANTCOM has the responsibility for the conduct of air base visit programs of U.S. forces/facilities in Iceland and the Azores.

(c) Invitations to other participating states will be made by the State Department and the host state. Up to two visitors from each participating state will be invited.

(d) The length of the visit will be determined by consultation with the host state. VDOC 92 specifies that it will last a minimum of twenty-four hours.

(e) Visitors will normally arrive at a point of entry designated by the host state, normally a major commercial international travel airport or border crossing. The host state will normally escort the visitors to the U.S. base, as necessary, then pass escort responsibility to U.S. representatives, unless this responsibility was passed to the USG at the point of entry. Escort responsibility will be returned to the host state upon completion of the visit.

(f) Upon arrival at a designated assembly point

and entry to the base, the visitors will receive an unclassified briefing by the base commander or his designated representative which depicts the purpose and function of the air base and current activity at the air base. The briefing should include, at a minimum, the units operating from the base, the number of personnel/aircraft (by type), and the unclassified missions/functions of those aircraft. The orientation briefing should also describe constraints on the visitors' access due to security or safety restrictions. Tenant unit commanders or their senior representatives should be in attendance and should be prepared to discuss their unclassified unit functions and missions.

(g) The inbriefing should be followed by a tour of the facility where the visitors will have an opportunity to view all aircraft types at the base. The degree to which access is granted to aircraft is at the discretion of the base and/or tenant unit commanders.

(h) Access to sensitive points may be denied. The visitors will have the opportunity to observe normal flight operations and to communicate with commanders and base personnel, who should be as open and forthright as operational security considerations permit. USAFE/HQ USNAVEUR will provide base personnel the necessary guidance to comply with operational security requirements. Unit commanders should ensure their personnel and local escorts have received security awareness training prior to the visit.

(i) HQ USEUCOM will participate in the planning of visits to U.S. air bases and will be available to advise local commanders about the conduct of the air base visit. HQ USEUCOM will assist as necessary in arranging translation/interpretation support for the program.

(j) The extent of U.S. responsibilities for some aspects of the air base visit will be determined in consultation with the host state. Component commands should be prepared to provide lodging on the visited base or arrange commercial lodging in a local facility, local transportation, meals, and other arrangements similar to those provided in the VDOC 92 observation program.

(k) Commanders should strive to minimize the impact on normal activities during the visit.

(l) For passive air base visits, the base commander is responsible to prepare an after action report. This report may be routed through the air base senior headquarters, but a copy will be submitted to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO AE 09128 within thirty days following completion of the visit. The report should include, as a minimum, the items listed in subparagraph b.(1)(e) above, plus the costs associated with the visit, by major category, estimated where necessary.

c. Demonstrations of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems.

(1) Demonstrations are required for new types of major weapon and equipment systems introduced into the zone of application. These demonstrations may be done in conjunction with some other CSBM activity, such as an air base visit or observation, or they may be done outside a CSBM event. There is no requirement to demonstrate this equipment if another participating state has already done so.

(2) The procedures outlined in subparagraphs b.(1)(a) through b.(1)(d) above concerning invitations, replies to invitations, and visitors to air base visits also apply to the demonstration of new types of weapon and equipment systems.

d. Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

(1) Notification of activities that exceed thresholds must be provided by the USG through diplomatic channels at least forty-two days in advance of the activity. To meet requirements for coordination within USG and NATO, the Joint Staff requires USEUCOM draft input NLT seventy days in advance of the activity (eighty days for REFORGER-related activities). Component commands should forward their draft input to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5/ECJ3, NLT seventy-seven days in advance (eighty-seven days for REFORGER) in order to allow sufficient time for resolution of problems and coordination with Allies.

(2) Component command input will follow the format at paragraphs (40) through (44.2) of the VDOC 92. For use inside U.S. channels, component commands will also specify air and sea ports of entry/departure and POMCUS sites to be used, if applicable.

(3) Alerts. Component commands will provide HQ USEUCOM notification information on activities to be conducted with no notice to troops (i.e., alerts) not less than nine days prior to commencement of the activity. This will allow time to process the information through channels and for the State Department to announce the notification at the same time the alert commences.

(4) Sample notifications are at Appendix E.

e. Observation of Certain Military Activities. The VDOC 92 provides for observation of any military activity in the zone which exceeds the thresholds of 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks for land force activities, or 3,500 troops for an airborne landing or amphibious assault, by up to two representatives from each participating state. The provision has two aspects: active and passive observations. Observations are termed "active" in referring to the inspecting state and "passive" when referring to the inspected state.

(1) Active Observations.

(a) The U.S. sends two observers to every observable exercise. One observer normally will be a member of the Defense Attache Office accredited to the country in which the observation occurs. USEUCOM will nominate an officer for the second observer position. The Joint Staff reserves the option, however, to substitute a Joint Staff observer for the USEUCOM nominee. For active observations in East European countries or the new states of the former Soviet Union, the second observer may be a flag officer, although generally only for very large or significant exercises. For active observations in Neutral/Non-Aligned and NATO states, the second observer will ordinarily be no more senior than a colonel (O-6).

(b) As a rule, the annual calendars of VDOC 92 participating states can be used to anticipate opportunities to send observers to activities. HQ USEUCOM will allocate observer billets to component commands on the basis of the type of activity involved. This allocation will be made early in the calendar year to provide maximum planning time. Commands or agencies which receive allocations will be prepared to provide observer personal data to HQ USEUCOM forty-two days prior to the forecasted start date of the exercise, as shown on the HQ USEUCOM allocation message.

(c) Component commands will ensure that observers have valid passports and, once the invitation has been made, that the observers have applied for visas from the embassy of the state in which the activity is to be observed, if required.

(d) Observers will normally be briefed at HQ USEUCOM prior to departing for observer duty. Upon return from observer duty, observers will normally participate in a debriefing at HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5. HQ USEUCOM will assist the observation team to prepare a written after action report to be forwarded to the Joint Staff, J5, within ten working days after the completion of the observation program. The Joint Staff/J5 will normally brief Joint Staff officers serving as observers.

(e) Military observers will wear the battle dress uniform (BDU) or equivalent utility uniform during observation activities in the field, with inclement weather uniform items as necessary. Observers will wear the Class A uniform with blouse for most evening meals and social activities. A civilian suit may be taken for optional wear to social activities.

(2) Passive Observations.

(a) The United States will participate in hosting observers when delegated responsibility by the state on whose territory the observable activity will occur. Currently, only

the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has delegated such responsibility. Guidance provided through coordination with the FRG, or another host nation in the future, will be implemented. Requirements for observation programs are specified in paragraphs (45) through (64) of the VDOC 92.

(b) The responsibility for preparation and conduct of U.S.-hosted observation programs is delegated to the component commands: HQ USAREUR will be responsible for the conduct of observation programs of U.S. ground forces and airborne activities; HQ USNAVEUR will be responsible for the conduct of observation programs of U.S. land-based naval air and amphibious forces activities. Unless otherwise directed, component commands will be responsible for conduct of the observation program in the exercise area after the host country has welcomed the observers. Component commands will establish procedures for the planning and conduct of observation programs. Coordination between component commands is encouraged. The component command conducting the observation program will submit draft itineraries to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5-F, as they are developed, which will be shared with the host state NLT sixty days prior to the start of the exercise. Component command preparations for observation programs will be part of exercise planning procedures. Costs of observation programs, including hotel/billeting arrangements, transportation, meals, and all other related expenses, should be included in exercise planning estimates and will be funded by the component command responsible for the exercise.

(c) Duration of the observation program will be from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met (paragraph (54)). Whenever the observation program may involve a lengthy period before and/or after the active maneuver phase, an abbreviated program may be organized for the convenience of observers who wish to be present only for the active maneuver phase. The only difference between the abbreviated "core" program and the full-length program will be the dates and times of arrival and departure of observers.

(d) Local transportation will be provided so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation program (paragraph (55)). The component command responsible for the observation will provide observers with appropriate means of transportation during the observation program (paragraph (61.8)). In preparing the observation program, every effort should be made to maximize the number of hours actually visiting or observing exercise activity and to minimize the time spent in transit. Backup transportation should be made available. Helicopters should be used to the greatest extent practical.

(e) The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions. During their mission, they will be granted the privileges and

immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, required by paragraph (58) of VDOC 92.

(f) The host state and U.S. forces stationed in the host state or participating in activities in the host state will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations, or defense sites (paragraph (60)) or inside operations centers and crew compartments of combat vehicles. Such access may be granted at the discretion of the local commander while keeping in mind appropriate OPSEC considerations. Observers will be permitted to use cameras, dictaphones, and other permitted observation equipment outside of command posts, communications centers, and combat vehicles. Any restrictions on the right to take photographs should be announced at the observation point in question. General restrictions on photography of sensitive points should be explained during the initial observation briefing.

(g) The observation program will begin with a briefing on the purpose, basic situation, and phases of the activity and will explain any changes from the notification. Observers will be provided a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of not more than 1:250,000 depicting the initial tactical situation.

(h) The observers will be provided with appropriate observation equipment. Normally, this equates to one pair of binoculars per observer. Observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, maps, photo and video cameras, dictaphones, and hand-held passive night-vision devices, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host state (paragraph (61.3)). Component commands will also make available for each observer sufficient inclement weather equipment or special clothing, including rain gear, cold weather parkas, and mittens, as necessary (paragraph (52.7)).

(i) During the observation program, observers will be briefed on a daily basis, with the help of maps, on the various phases of the activity and their development. The daily briefing should include, as a handout if practical, a sketch, overlay, or other depiction of the current tactical situation. Observers will be informed about their geographic positions at every observation point (this can be listed on the daily schedule). Information on air or naval activity related to the ground force activity will be briefed by uniformed representatives of the appropriate military service (paragraph (61.5)).

(j) Observers will be provided opportunities to directly observe forces participating in the activity, so that observers get an impression of the flow of the activity. They will be given opportunities to observe or visit major combat and support units (below division level) participating in the activity, as well as subordinate units, and to communicate with commanders and troops. Commanders or designated representatives

of participating formations will inform observers of the mission of their respective units (paragraph (61.6)).

(k) Observers will be guided in the area of military activity by a U.S. escort team (paragraph (61.7)). The component command will designate, as the senior USEUCOM escort officer, a colonel (O-6), who will serve as host on a daily basis, and such additional escorts as are deemed necessary to provide assistance to observers. Escorts with language capability in German, French, Russian, and other European languages are recommended.

(l) Observers will be provided access to telephones or other means of communications and afforded opportunities for timely communications with their embassies or other official missions/consulates. The host state is not obliged to cover the communications expenses of the observers.

(m) Observers will be provided appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation program and, when necessary, medical care.

(n) Observation of military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved (alerts) will be conducted starting seventy-two hours after the initiation of the activity, so long as the observation threshold has been met, and will last as long as the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded.

(o) Funding for observation programs will be provided by the component command conducting the exercise. Funding should be programmed during development of program objective memoranda (POM).

(p) Information in oral briefings, question and answer sessions, and formal remarks at receptions or dinners will be presented in English and translated simultaneously, where possible. Where simultaneous translation is not practical, translation will be first in the language of the host country, then in Russian. Translators can be requested from the State Department or OSIA. Written material essential to the observation program, such as the daily schedule and administrative instructions on hotel and telephone services and the like, will be made available in English, the language of the host country, and Russian. All other non-essential information provided by U.S. hosts need only be in English. Paragraph (57) states all observers "will be provided equal treatment." The practical difficulties in providing translation into all CSCE languages and accepted practice over several years' experience with the Stockholm Document have dictated that only three languages will normally be used for the observation programs. English and Russian are now accepted as the most appropriate common languages, with the addition of the host country language added for obvious reasons.

(q) Observers may make requests with regard to the observation program (paragraph (53)). Observation hosts will accede to them, wherever practical and appropriate within normal considerations of safety and OPSEC.

(r) Observers will be provided unclassified information on the exercise play, phases, troop participation, and equipment to the degree practical. Information which is normally classified will remain classified, except that details required to be in the official notification (paragraphs (41) through (44.2) of the VDOC 92) will become unclassified forty-two days prior to the start of the activity by virtue of the VDOC 92 notification process.

(s) At least once during the observation, the itinerary should include a stop at an activity during the hours of darkness or twilight, if this can be arranged. The purpose is to set the example of using the observation period productively and encouraging reciprocal opportunities to observe a representative sample of the full range of exercise activities.

(t) If practical, at least one observer from each country should be given an overview of the exercise from the air via helicopter flight (para (61.4)). Helicopters will be provided by the host state or the U.S. by arrangement with the host state. Observers will be provided ear plugs for noise protection.

(u) Observers will be given opportunities to eat lunch in the field with soldiers of units being visited. Troop rations are suitable. Breakfast and supper meals in the hotel where observers are billeted should normally be arranged as informal buffets or the like.

(v) Social activities are an important part of the observation program, but should not intrude on the observation of exercise activity. It may be appropriate for the USEUCOM component command to arrange a formal dinner for observers during the observation program, if agreed to by the host state. At this dinner, the senior U.S. commander directing the observable activity, or his deputy, should serve as host. Care should be taken to include the host state's senior escort in this function as co-host and include host state officials and escorts as well. This dinner should be held during the core observation program when the active maneuver phase is being held.

(w) Subject to guidance from the host state, opportunities may be provided to permit observers to do some shopping or sightseeing on their own.

(x) An after action report on the observation program will be provided to HQ USEUCOM NLT thirty days after the program has ended. This report should include, as a minimum, the

following items: a copy of the complete itinerary; a list of participants, by state, if available; a copy of any handouts, maps, and sketches given to the visitors; a synopsis of visitor questions and requests and the results; an indication of areas in which observers were interested; any problems or issues requiring HQ USEUCOM resolution; any information that should be passed to the Joint Staff or NATO Allies; a list of observation expenses by major category, lodging/meals, transportation, etc.; and recommendations.

f. Annual Calendar and Constraining Provisions.

(1) The VDOC 92 requires that each participating state exchange with all other participating states an annual calendar of its notifiable military activities forecast for the subsequent calendar year. Additionally, notifiable military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks must be forecast two years in advance. Calendars are passed to the participating states NLT 15 November for the following year. To meet requirements for coordination within the USG and NATO, the Joint Staff requires USEUCOM draft input NLT 1 October. This requirement dictates that USEUCOM component commands forward their draft input to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3/ECJ5, NLT 22 September each year to permit time to resolve ambiguities.

(2) HQ USAREUR and HQ USNAVEUR submit information required in paragraphs (67) through (74) of the VDOC 92 and coordinate with HQ USAFE to ensure agreement of information on supporting air activity. Information should be provided in three sections: (a) a chronological listing of those activities in which the U.S. participation is expected to exceed the notification threshold, (b) a forecast two years out of activities expected to exceed 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks, and (c) a list of NATO activities in which U.S. participation is less than the notification threshold but where the total Allied participation may exceed the threshold. In all cases, levels of Allied participation should be included, if known.

(3) Submissions are a forecast and need not be more detailed than the VDOC 92 requires. Information provided must be sufficient to identify the activity but should be general enough to allow planners flexibility for changes to occur. If changes to the calendar are to be made, it is more in keeping with the spirit of the Document for the changes to reflect a decrease in scale, rather than an increase. For this reason, slightly overestimating the size or scale of an activity on an annual calendar is prudent. CSBM implementation experience indicates that any increase in size or scale over that originally forecast on the annual calendar will be called into question.

(4) Information on participation of U.S. forces in Allied exercises is also required; e.g., if a U.S. battalion is participating in an FRG exercise. Figures on Allied participation in U.S.-planned/-conducted exercises, as well as in Allied-

planned/-conducted exercises in which U.S. forces are participating, should be indicated. Sufficient information must be provided so that the Joint Staff, through national-level coordination with Allies, will be able to determine whether the U.S. must notify the exercise or whether U.S. participation will contribute to making an Allied exercise notifiable.

(5) Incomplete information is preferable to a missed suspense, however, any activity over 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks expected to occur two years out must be on the calendar. Failure to announce such an activity two years in advance will require the size of the exercise to be limited to fewer than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks. The annual calendar is a forecast and can be amended; however, experience has shown that it is difficult to gain approval for changes reflecting additions or increases in troop strength. Information on activity which was forecasted on the annual calendar, but subsequently reduced below the notification threshold, will be forwarded through channels. HQ USEUCOM will recommend that the USG deliver an annual calendar change indicating the decreased scale of the exercise. Exercises forecast as observable, which have been scaled back, will not normally incur a USG requirement to conduct an observation program.

(6) The Official Standard Names Gazetteer, approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names and prepared by the Office of Geography, U.S. Department of the Interior, will be used to ensure uniformity and accuracy in reporting place names and geographic coordinates.

(7) Sample annual calendar submission is at Appendix D.

g. Inspections. Inspections are directed against a geographic area specified by the inspecting state, not against a specific unit. Inspections are termed "active" in referring to the inspecting state and "passive" when referring to the inspected state. Per reference A-3, OSIA is responsible for implementation of the active inspection provisions of the VDOC 92. The following policies are established.

(1) Active Inspections.

(a) In accordance with reference A-3, OSIA is responsible for organizing, planning, and conducting active VDOC 92 inspections. OSIA will man and train the VDOC 92 inspection team. USEUCOM will provide appropriate assistance at the request of OSIA.

(b) HQ USEUCOM, ECJ2, in coordination with DIA and the intelligence community, will monitor other CSCE state activities for compliance and identify, expeditiously, those activities where compliance is in doubt.

(c) OSIA is responsible for transportation of the

VDOC 92 inspection team for conduct of inspections. OSIA may request USEUCOM flight support through HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3, when necessary.

(2) Passive Inspections.

(a) Passive inspections are the responsibility of the state on whose territory the inspection takes place. The territory of the United States is not subject to VDOC 92 inspection and the USG, therefore, cannot be host to an inspection. The USG role during a passive inspection is limited to advising U.S. forces inside the inspection area and, at the host state's discretion, assisting the host state. USG policy is to provide OSIA liaison team assistance in an inspection on Allied territory where U.S. forces are exercising. USEUCOM will normally augment the OSIA team with one or two component command officers knowledgeable of the particular exercise.

(b) Verification provisions of the VDOC 92 allow a state to request an inspection of another state when compliance with agreed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) is in doubt. Technically, the inspection is directed against a geographic area specified by the inspecting state, not against a specific unit or activity. Inspectors need not be permitted in areas such as military garrisons, air bases, or other defense installations. Terrain outside excluded areas is subject to inspection, to include both local and major training areas. Planned or on-going training is not to be terminated, nor will forces be moved back to garrison early based purely on the fact that the specified inspection area encompasses a training activity. As is appropriate for all training activities, commanders may enforce normal OPSEC procedures whether or not a VDOC 92 inspection is being conducted. In the event inspectors visit a U.S. unit in the specified area and choose to ask questions, their questions will be answered in an open and straightforward manner to the greatest extent possible. If a complete answer would require divulging classified information, simply tell the inspectors the information is classified and the question cannot be answered.

(c) In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Ministry of Defense (FMOD) may, at its discretion, inform HQ USEUCOM Command Duty Officer (CDO) (DSN 433-1110 or civilian 0711-680-1110) or the OSIA Operations Center (DSN 330-7295/6 or civilian 069-69-7295/7296) as soon as a request for inspection is received from another state. In the case of other NATO allies receiving an inspection, the USDAO will forward warning information via telephone, followed by FLASH message to HQ USEUCOM CDO (USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ3-CCD//). HQ USEUCOM will pass inspection information to HQ USAREUR/USAFE/USNAVEUR (USLANTCOM for Iceland and the Azores) and OSIA-E by telephone (non-secure permitted) and electronic message at FLASH precedence, info OSIA, Washington, D.C., to alert Director, OSIA of possible OSIA involvement in upcoming CSBM activity. Information to be passed

to/from HQ USEUCOM CDO (ECJ3-CCD) will be in accordance with paragraphs (90) through (90.10) of VDOC 92 to the greatest extent possible.

(d) Upon notification of an inspection, USEUCOM component commands will first determine which, if any, U.S. forces are engaged in out-of-garrison activities in the specified area, and which, if any, U.S. installations are located in specified area. Component commands will forward this information, to include unit/installation designation and, if known, location in geographic or UTM coordinates, to HQ USEUCOM Command Duty Officer (ECJ3-CCD) via FLASH message and telephonically within twelve hours.

(e) When a U.S. exercise or activity is occurring in the specified area, the directing headquarters will provide the OSIA liaison team with a knowledgeable officer with whom to consult. This individual will be prepared to brief inspectors on the nature and scope of the activity, if required. If a NATO command is conducting the activity, the commander of the U.S. contingent in the exercise/activity will provide a knowledgeable officer to consult with the OSIA liaison team concerning the U.S. role in the activity and to brief the inspectors, if required, on the nature and scope of the U.S. participation in the activity.

(f) Component commands will provide support to, and participate as part of, the OSIA liaison team to the U.S. forces in the specified inspection area. See Appendix F.

(g) OSIA will provide liaison personnel who are qualified to advise USEUCOM commanders/personnel on VDOC 92 implementation issues.

(h) Units in the field will report instances in which members of inspection teams inspect U.S. units. Reports will be forwarded through the appropriate component command, to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5-F, via IMMEDIATE-precedence message. Reports will include the unit designation and location, the time of contact with inspectors, any questions asked by inspectors and the answers provided by U.S. personnel, and the activities of inspectors (what equipment was photographed, on what did inspectors focus, etc.).

(i) In the specified inspection area, inspectors are permitted access, entry, and unobstructed survey, except for areas and sensitive points to which access is normally denied or controlled. Access to military/defense installations (except for training areas) and the interiors of military vehicles, aircraft, and ships can be denied to inspectors. Inspectors may be excluded from command posts. Access controls notwithstanding, commanders are authorized to grant access to inspectors to any vehicles/facilities at their discretion, given normal consideration to OPSEC.

(j) Detailed information and responsibilities of the liaison team are outlined in Appendix F.

h. Evaluations. The purpose of the evaluation visit is to determine the accuracy of the annual information exchange. The VDOC 92 describes the evaluation as the "possibility to see the personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the unit reported under paragraph (11) in their normal locations." Signatory states will allow a 2-man team of evaluators (plus one interpreter) to visit active formations and units in their normal peacetime locations specified in the annual information exchange (paragraph (113)). Evaluations are termed "active" in referring to the inspecting state and "passive" when referring to the inspected state.

(1) Active Evaluations. OSIA will conduct evaluations of other CSCE states' information exchange. USEUCOM will assist, as appropriate, in coordination with OSIA-E.

(2) Passive Evaluations.

a. Information included in the annual exchange of military information is subject to evaluation on a quota basis. Active units and formations included in the information exchange are subject to evaluation in their normal peacetime locations. Equipment in storage is not subject to evaluation. Non-active formations and combat units temporarily activated will be made available for evaluation during the period of temporary activation and in the area/ location of activation indicated under paragraph (11.3.5). In such cases, the provisions for the evaluation of active formations and units will be applicable, mutatis mutandis. Evaluation visits conducted under this provision will count against the quotas established under paragraph (114).

b. Each participating state is obligated to accept one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty units, or portions thereof, reported in the annual exchange of military information (paragraphs (11) through (11.5.52)). At current and projected strength, the USG is obliged to accept no more than one evaluation visit per year.

c. Participating states will forward requests for evaluation through designated VDOC 92 channels to the U.S. State Department, which will forward them to OSD and the Joint Staff. The notification must state the specific unit to be visited and the date of arrival at the unit. States receiving requests for evaluation visits will have five days notice prior to the arrival of the evaluation teams.

d. Units out-of-garrison can be declared unavailable for an evaluation visit. Units in garrison will generally be available for evaluation, although such a request can be denied on a limited basis. Such a denial will generally be done

only for reasons of policy, decided in Washington. Although evaluations will usually be conducted in normal peacetime locations, the USG may elect to offer an evaluation of a unit located out-of-garrison, e.g., at Grafenwoehr. In responding to the initial notification, the affected component command should include a recommendation in these instances.

e. The notification system used for alerting USEUCOM units of VDOC 92 inspections will be used to notify specific units of their designation for evaluation. Following receipt of the initial notification, the affected USEUCOM component command will ascertain the status of the unit to be evaluated, and within twelve hours, inform HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5 (or command center after duty hours), whether the unit will be available for evaluation. This rapid response is necessary to allow time to staff the decision to accept the visit and to reply to the visiting state within the required time.

f. HQ USEUCOM is responsible for compliance with VDOC 92 provisions in the conduct of the evaluation. The responsibility for preparation and implementation of U.S.-hosted evaluation programs is delegated to the component commands: HQ USAREUR is responsible to implement evaluation visits of U.S. ground forces and airborne activities; HQ USAFE is responsible to implement evaluation visits of USAFE activities; and HQ USNAVEUR is responsible to implement evaluation visits of U.S. land-based naval air and amphibious forces activities. USLANTCOM is responsible to plan and implement evaluation visits to U.S. forces/facilities in Iceland and the Azores.

g. The OSIA escort team acts as the USG representative for VDOC 92-related matters during evaluations. On site, the team provides official interpretation of the VDOC 92 and resolves any document-related issues between the evaluated personnel, the evaluation team, and the host state liaison. OSIA will also provide advice to the unit commander, as requested. The same relationship exists between OSIA and the unit commander as for CFE implementation: OSIA bears responsibility for interpretation of the document; the unit commander bears responsibility for compliance with the VDOC 92 provisions as they relate to the site. OSIA is responsible for the activities of the U.S. escort team which accompanies evaluators and for contact with host state representatives. As VDOC 92 experts and the official USG representatives, OSIA will control all liaison/escorts and advise/assist the USEUCOM unit commander in the conduct of the evaluation. The USEUCOM unit commander is otherwise in charge and will be the final authority regarding the conduct of the visit on his installation.

h. Evaluation teams will be accompanied at all times by representatives of the receiving state. USEUCOM component commands will provide at least two site guides to accompany the evaluation party. In accordance with existing bilateral agreements, up to two host state personnel plus one interpreter,

if necessary, will be allowed on U.S. installations as members of the official escort team.

i. Evaluations will be completed in the course of a single working day and may last up to twelve hours. Planning to receive the evaluation team should include the possibility that the team remains overnight, either prior to or after the evaluation. The evaluation will commence with a briefing by the USEUCOM unit commander or deputy commander which describes the major unit weapons, other equipment, and personnel status. The briefing should be based on Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) site briefings, excluding purely CFE aspects, and may also include general descriptions of unit mission, training, exercises, and living conditions, etc. This information should be presented in a form which emphasizes the non-threatening nature of U.S. presence in Europe.

j. In accordance with the VDOC 92, paragraph (132.1), the evaluators must be allowed to "see the personnel and equipment" for the specifically designated formation (division or higher) or unit (brigade/wing equivalent), but not for any of its subordinate formations or units. Current USG guidance is to offer visits to associated units, e.g., if a division is visited, offer visits to the divisional cavalry squadron, a maintenance unit, engineer unit, etc. Selection will be at discretion of the component command and should be based on physical proximity and availability. Per paragraph (132.2), for visits to units (brigade/wing equivalent), subordinate units (battalion/squadron equivalent) may be visited. "See" is interpreted as visual access with physical contact only at the discretion of the unit commander(s). Personnel and equipment need not be placed on display for the evaluators. Access should be granted to normal, scheduled activities in a manner so that effect on normal activities is minimized.

k. Access may be denied to sensitive points, facilities, and equipment. The VDOC 92 allows relatively great flexibility in the designation of sensitive points. While the provision should not be abused, component commands will deny access, through the OSIA team chief, to all sensitive areas, equipment, and facilities without explanation to the evaluators, except to cite the sensitive point provisions of the VDOC 92 when denying access. Unit representatives will inform the OSIA escorts of such sensitive points, and OSIA will communicate access denial to the evaluators, as necessary.

l. Unit commanders will ensure troops are aware of their VDOC 92 obligations and how to conduct themselves during the course of the evaluation.

m. The evaluated unit or its senior headquarters will provide local transportation for the evaluation team and escorts unless previously coordinated otherwise. Wheeled vehicles will generally suffice, but helicopters may be required/

desirable if the evaluated unit/formation is in other than its normal peacetime location. The VDOC 92 calls for "appropriate" transportation. The host country is responsible for transporting the evaluation team to the U.S. site and may make that transportation available to the unit for local transportation, if necessary.

n. The safety of U.S. troops and the evaluation team is critical during the evaluation.

o. With consideration of the above point and at the discretion of the component command, the unit may offer evaluators the opportunity to participate in some aspect of unit training, such as small arms firing, weapon system simulators, or vehicle driving/rides, etc. The evaluators should seek to minimize disruption of normal unit activities during the evaluation.

p. A written report containing the same elements required following an air base visit (see sub-paragraph b.(1)(e) above) is required. Copies will be submitted to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, APO AE 09128 within thirty days of the evaluation visit.

7. Funding. In accordance with reference A-3, OSIA provides funding for active U.S. inspections and evaluations, as well as for U.S. liaison team expenses. HQ USEUCOM funds per diem and travel for U.S. observers assigned to USEUCOM and for USDAOs. This funding includes attendance at pre- and post-observation briefings at HQ USEUCOM, if applicable. Expenses for non-USEUCOM personnel are the responsibility of their sending headquarters and should be included in their budget estimates. Funding of observation programs and air base visits for which U.S. forces will be host or co-host will be provided by the component commands responsible for the observable activities and must be considered during exercise planning. Funding of other travel, such as for conferences, must be provided by the sending headquarters. Orders for that temporary duty which HQ USEUCOM will fund will be prepared by HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5, and mailed/faxed to the observers. Observers will forward a copy of their settlement voucher to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5, as soon as the claim is completed.

8. Reports and Suspenses. The following is a recapitulation of suspense timelines outlined in this Directive.

a. Component commands will submit the required annual information on military forces using the CAATS confirm process on the Defense Management and Notification System (DM/NS) to HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ4, by noon on the Friday preceding Thanksgiving week in November of each year.

b. Component commands will provide annual calendar input to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3/ECJ5 NLT 22 September of each year. Changes to exercise start dates and significant changes in the scale of exercises will be provided to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 and ECJ5, as soon

as they occur.

c. Component commands will provide draft notifications to HQ USEUCOM seventy-seven days prior to the earliest scheduled start date of the activity (eighty-seven days for REFORGER).

d. Component commands responsible for an observation program will provide draft itineraries of the intended observation program to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5 as they are developed, which will be provided to host state officials sixty days prior to the start date of the exercise.

e. Component commands will provide written reports to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5, on the conduct of U.S. observation programs for which they are responsible within thirty days of the end of the observation program.

f. Component commands will provide written draft notification of notifiable alerts to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 and ECJ5, NLT nine days prior to the initiation of such alerts.

g. In the event of a passive inspection of a NATO country, component commands will provide information on U.S. out-of-garrison activity in the inspection specified area to the HQ USEUCOM Command Duty Officer (ECJ3-CCD) within twelve hours after receiving the inspection notice.

h. Component commands and agencies providing U.S. VDOC 92 observers to foreign activities will be prepared to furnish observer personal data to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5, a minimum of forty-two days prior to the forecasted start date of the activity.

i. Observers to active observations and visitors to active air base visits will, with the assistance of HQ USEUCOM, submit a written after action report to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5 within seven days of the completion of the activity, to be forwarded to the Joint Staff, J5.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

ROBERT D. CHELBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff

Appendixes:

- A - References
- B - Vienna Document 1992 (published separately)
- C - Explanation of Vienna Document Provisions
- D - Sample Annual Calendar and Forecast
- E - Sample Notifications
- F - Liaison Team

G - Glossary

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DAO TIRANA - 2	USLANTCOM - 4

OFFICIAL:

RONALD ROUGHEAD
LTC, USA
Adjutant General

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Appendix A

References

References listed below contain key USG or JCS interpretations and policy established during the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) implementation, as well as additional guidance developed for the VDOC 92.

A-1. Vienna Document 1992 (VDOC 92), 4 Mar 1992 (Appendix B).

A-2. Joint Staff Memorandum, Implementation Directive for the Vienna Document 1992, 13 July 1992.

A-3. Memorandum of Understanding Between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM, and OSIA for Mutual Liaison and Support Operations in Implementation of the Vienna Document 1992 (VDOC 92).

A-4 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Federal Republic of Germany

A-5 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Kingdom of the Netherlands

A-6 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Kingdom of Spain

A-7 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Republic of Iceland

A-8 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, Republic of Italy

A-9 Bilateral Agreement, Vienna Document 1990, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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Appendix B

Vienna Document 1992

(PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)

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Appendix C

Explanation of VDOC 92 Provisions

C-1. (U) Purpose. To provide background and interpretive guidance on provisions of the VDOC 92.

C-2. (U) Scope. This appendix expands on areas of the VDOC 92 which are ambiguous, require a USG or USEUCOM interpretation, or for which unwritten understandings exist based on the Vienna negotiations. These interpretations are reflected in Joint Staff Implementation Guidance (reference A-2), based on Stockholm Document implementation experience and the CSBM negotiations record.

C-3. (U) General. These explanations are addressed in parallel with the major sections of the VDOC 92. The paragraph numbering system of the VDOC 92 will be used.

C-4. (U) Explanation by Selected Paragraphs.

(10) Information will be reported only for military forces in the zone. "In the zone of application" means permanently stationed in the zone.

(11.1) Footnotes * and **. The term "equivalents" is interpreted as follows:

LAND	AIR
Army	Major Command
Corps	Numbered Air Force
Division	Air Division
Brigade/Regiment	Wing

(11.1.1) Provide the number of units (brigade, regiment, wing, or equivalent) listed in Chart I of the information exchange and the resultant quota (one for every sixty units or portion thereof).

(11.2.1) Designation equates to unit title, subordination to immediate higher headquarters.

(11.2.2) Footnote ****. Authorized combat strength equates to war authorized strength.

(11.2.4) and (11.5.4) Peacetime authorized personnel strength equates to authorized strength.

(11.2.5) Type of weapon and equipment systems should be reported the same as for CFE under the provisions of the "protocol on existing types (POET)." Formations report their total holding of reportable equipment, not just that held by subordinate combat units.

(11.2.5.3) Report on armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), heavy armored combat vehicles (HACVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs) as defined in CFE.

(11.2.5.4) APC and AIFV look-alikes are to be included in the ACV column. Note: A new column format may be adopted prior to the December 1992 exchange.

(11.2.5.5) Antitank guided missile launchers include only vehicles not reported as "armored combat vehicles" (ACVs) (e.g., U.S. M901).

(11.3.1) This deals with active formations and units. The increase must be over the peacetime authorized personnel strength as listed in the information exchange by the threshold amount and must be for more than twenty-one days. For formations, personnel increases in separately reported subordinate formations and units are not counted toward that formation's 5,000 personnel threshold. For example, a corps would count only increases in its directly subordinate combat support and service support units and not its divisions, corps artillery brigade, or cavalry regiment because they are subject to their own separate reporting requirements.

(11.3.2) This applies to nonactive formations and units

reported in the information exchange that are planned to be activated. The activation takes effect when 2,000 or more troops are present for more than twenty-one days. This is important because once activated, these units become subject to evaluation.

(11.3.4) The goal is to report increases (11.3.1) or temporary activations (11.3.2) in the annual calendar. However, if plans are made after the annual calendar submission, notification should be made at least forty-two days in advance of the increase or activation. In the case of no advance notice to the troops (alert activity), notification should be made, at the latest, at the time of the increase or activation.

(11.5) "Naval aviation permanently based on land" (land-based naval air) means combat aircraft as defined in CFE that are subordinate to naval forces but are not based aboard ship. Land-based naval air includes maritime patrol aircraft.

(11.5.2) and (11.5.3) An air unit's normal peacetime location and normal peacetime air base or military airfield may be the same location. If so, it should be reported as such.

(12.1) Required data and photos (see paragraph (13.9)) will be provided to all parties once no later than 15 December 1992. Because much of this is CFE data that have already been exchanged between CFE parties, the data need not be exchanged with them again. An exception is data on ATGMs, which were not covered by the CFE exchange. Initial data for major weapon and equipment systems in the zone will not include information under "Data on new types or versions...."

(12.2) The definition of "new types or versions" was left to the individual states. A new type or version under CFE protocol is considered a new type or version for this measure. Only CFE data are required for all existing systems reported in the December 1991 CSBM information exchange. When a new type or version is deployed for the first time in the zone of application, all data are required, including the additional data listed under "Data on new types or versions will...." If any other state has provided data prior to the U.S., we can, if applicable, certify that data provided by the first state are correct for our weapon system. This certification fulfills our obligation.

(13.2.1.4.2) Seating capacity includes driver and crew.

(13.7.3.1) This means systems built into the aircraft, not "hung on." Report as machine gun, death ray, etc.

(13.8.3.1) Use CFE helicopter definitions. This will help to move the U.S. toward more compatibility between CSBM and CFE data exchanges.

(13.8.3.2) See paragraph (13.7.3.1) above.

(13.9) Photos will be provided to all parties ONCE. CFE photos may be utilized, but they cannot have "CFE" printed on them. Refer to subparagraph (12.2) above.

(13.11) Format was not defined specifically to avoid any changes in the existing CFE format. Use CFE format for data.
NOTE: "CFE" may not appear on the photos in accordance with the CFE treaty.

(14) through (15.4) Report any systems specified in (11.2.5) through (11.5.5) that the U.S. plans to deploy to Europe the following year.

(18) USEUCOM and USLANTCOM will provide the in-theater points of contact for all hazardous incidents of a military nature. Reports of potential hazardous incidents of a military nature will be made to the Joint Staff through the National Military Command System (NMCS).

(19) Personnel envisaged to take part in visits to dispel concerns about military activities are principally the DAO or other representatives accredited to the host country.

(19.1) There is no specific method for expressing concern about certain military activities. The invitees will most likely be from neighboring states.

(20) An air base visit is not linked to any air activity. The purpose of the visit is primarily to observe the normal activity of an air base. When selecting individuals to represent the USG on an air base visit, consideration should be given to personnel with a background in aviation. For protocol reasons, one individual should be at least a lieutenant colonel (O-5), if possible.

(26) Negative replies are requested (if applicable) for all types of invitations. For personnel selected to participate in an air base visit, the following information should be provided: name; rank; date and place of birth; passport number; date and place of issue (passport); expiration date of passport; travel arrangements to include flight number and time and place of arrival. This information must be submitted in time to meet the 21-day window for the Department of State response to the invitation. Information on travel arrangements can be provided outside the 21-day response time and need not be in the initial reply to the invitation if it is unavailable.

(35) Demonstrations are required for new types only. The demonstration may be done in conjunction with some other CSBM activity (e.g., air base visits, observations of exercises), or it may be done completely outside a CSBM event, such as during an air or trade show. There is no requirement for a demonstration if another participating state has already conducted a demonstration of the same weapon or equipment system.

(35.3) All invitations require a positive or negative reply. Personal and travel information for participants to demonstrations follows the same format and timelines as for the reply to an air base visit outlined in paragraph (26) above.

(36) Prior Notifications. Participating States will give notification forty-two days in advance, in writing, through diplomatic channels. This requires the U.S. State Department to transmit U.S. notification to the appropriate embassies forty-five days in advance to preposition them for timely delivery. The Joint Staff drafts the initial notification for the State Department, based on input from USEUCOM, its component commands, and USLANTCOM, as well as other sources. In most cases, the USG coordinates within NATO sixty days in advance of an activity, and USEUCOM is required to provide information to the Joint Staff at least seventy days before the start of that activity or eighty days prior in the case of a REFORGER activity. In order to coordinate and validate information, HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 (info ECJ5) requires input from component commands seventy-seven days (eighty-seven days for REFORGER) before the deployment start date, the first day of the activity.

(37) Any time the U.S. conducts a notifiable activity, both the host state and the USG must notify the activity. HQ USEUCOM normally is asked to coordinate with the host state to ensure both notifications coincide.

(38) The following explanations are provided concerning notification instructions for USG notifications.

(a) Zone of Application for CSBMs. A land force activity must take place in the VDOC 92 zone for it to be subject to the provisions of the VDOC 92. This zone covers the whole of Europe from the Atlantic-to-the-Ural Mountains (ATTU) in the former Soviet Union and a significant part of Anatolian Turkey.

(b) The focus for all notifications is on land forces "in the field." This excludes, among other things, independent naval and air maneuvers and land force activity which takes place in garrison (i.e., not in the field), but includes amphibious landings or parachute assaults in the zone.

(c) Single activity refers to a self-contained activity. An exercise series such as the AUTUMN FORGE series is not a single activity under a single operational command and, therefore, is not notifiable; individual exercises within a series may be notifiable if they breach the thresholds.

(d) "In the field" is synonymous with "out-of-garrison." Only activities occurring outside of military garrisons are notifiable. Garrison locations, like sensitive points and restricted areas, are neither notifiable nor reportable. This protects the USG's capacity to use its bases in Europe as staging areas to respond to other worldwide contingencies without first

having to make announcements. A civilian airfield or seaport utilized temporarily by the military is considered to be "in the field."

(38.1) The land forces participating in this single activity must also be controlled by a single operational command. This refers to the controlling headquarters for the activity having the authority to assign operational missions to the forces in the field. This single operational command headquarters need not be physically located in the field, but those troops that are controlled by this headquarters and are located in the field, will be counted toward the troop and tank strength thresholds.

(a) There are three categories of notifications, as explained below:

(1) Engagement of formations in the same field exercise, under a single operational command, either independent of, or in combination with, air or naval components.

(2) Engagement of an amphibious assault landing or a parachute assault.

(3) Arrival or concentration of formations resulting from a transfer of troops, either from outside the zone of application to arrival points inside the zone, or from inside the zone to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated.

(b) The typical practice is to divide land force exercises into three phases: Deployment Phase, Active Exercise Phase, and Redeployment/Recovery Phase. Concentrations, amphibious landings, and parachute assaults are typically one-phase operations.

(38.1.1) Thresholds. Structure, combined with troop or tank thresholds being breached, constitutes notification.

(a) The structural threshold of a divisional structure or two or more brigades or regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division must be met prior to applying the numerical thresholds. Structure exists if the command post is in the field. USG guidance is that elements of divisions/brigades/regiments represent that unit in determining structure. For example, a brigade command post in the field represents that brigade.

(b) Once the structural/unit threshold is met, then a straight count of all troops participating in the activity, conducted in the field, responding to the same operational command, is conducted. The 9,000 troop threshold accounts for those troops assigned to and supporting the activity. Field deployed troops conducting combat support or service support functions within the same single activity and responding to the same single

operational command are counted along with those troops in the brigades or regiments when determining if an activity meets the threshold for notification. Troops participating in the activity from a garrison location are not counted toward the threshold determination.

(38.1.2) Aircraft sorties (excluding helicopters) are those conducted in support of the notified ground activity described in paragraph (38.1). Independent air operations will not be reported. For air operations supporting more than one other activity, report the number of sorties devoted to that notifiable activity. For example, an AIRCENT or AIRSOUTH independent air exercise totalling 2,000 sorties may allocate 500 of those sorties to a REFORGER-related FTX. The REFORGER FTX notification would specify 500 sorties.

(38.2) Notification of amphibious landings and parachute assaults pertains to single-phase amphibious landings or parachute drops of 3,000 or more troops without regard to structure.

(38.2.1) Cumulative troop strength is used in determining if the activity is notified. In determining notifiable troop strength for an amphibious landing, include only those troops that come across the beach, by boat or by helicopter. If the exercise is notifiable, personnel pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area who are or will be involved in the landing, but do not come across the beach, should be included under paragraph (42.1.1). This includes support and safety personnel. If at any time during the amphibious landing or parachute assault the cumulative strength breaches the threshold of 3,000 troops, then the entire activity is notifiable. The start time would be the date the first troops land on the beach or drop zone. Accordingly, once the amphibious landing or parachute assault is complete, then on that date the activity becomes a traditional land force activity, subject to the same criteria outlined in paragraphs (38), (38.1), and (38.1.1) (i.e., a notification threshold of 9,000 troops or 250 tanks).

(38.3.1) Transfers (i.e., movements), as such, are not notifiable or observable. The arrival of those transferred forces is notifiable if the arrival:

- (a) is in the CSBM zone of application,
- (b) is in the field; e.g., at a civil arrival point (civilian airfield or seaport) or outside a military garrison, and
- (c) meets the notifiable threshold, structure, and single activity criteria at any time.

(38.3.2) Arrivals at military air bases or military seaports are not subject to notification; however, should the troops involved in the transfer leave the military base at the notifi-

able level and conduct an otherwise notifiable activity (exercise, concentration), that activity is notifiable. Once forces are in the CSBM zone, their subsequent military transfers are treated as movements within the zone. REFORGER activities fall under these unique provisions.

(a) When REFORGER forces depart their military arrival points in Europe (which are not notifiable) or civil arrival points (which may be if appropriate criteria are met) to concentrate (assemble) in the field to train or for any purpose, then that concentration is notifiable if it satisfies the notification criteria per paragraph (38) of the VDOC 92.

(b) The USG will provide information on REFORGER activities in a single notification, depending on the relationship of the phases to the overall exercise, or by three separate notifications:

(1) REFORGER Deployment Concentration,

(2) active exercise in which REFORGER-deployed troops and forces stationed in Europe participate,

(3) REFORGER Redeployment Concentration.

Samples of these notifications are provided at Appendix E.

(39) An exception to the 42-day notification is when troops have no advanced notice of the activity, i.e., alerts. Alerts are not forecast in the annual calendar, even if they are pre-planned by higher headquarters.

(39.1) In the case of alerts, the notification will be given at the time the troops commence the activity. The normal thresholds for notification and observation apply. The duration of the alert must, however, exceed seventy-two hours for it to be observable, and only that portion of the alert extending beyond seventy-two hours is observable. Invitations to observe an alert activity must be sent concurrently with the notification of that activity. If an alert will become notifiable or observable, draft input reflecting information required by paragraphs (36) through (45.4) of the VDOC 92 must be provided by the initiating command to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 (info ECJ5) NLT nine days prior to initiation of the alert. This advance notification is necessary for Alliance and U.S. interagency coordination prior to release of the notification.

(41.3) In reporting multinational activities, U.S. notifications will include the names of all participating states and, if known, number of personnel by state, designation, subordination, number and types of divisions by state, and the total number of tanks disaggregated by state in accordance with subparagraphs (42.1.1), (42.1.2), and (42.1.3). CSCE states have agreed to notify military activities when they contribute forces above the

threshold level, or when they serve as host state for an activity which, in total, exceeds the thresholds. The FRG will always notify even U.S.-only activities which take place in the FRG, because the FRG is hosting the U.S. activities on its soil. The USG must also notify these activities. Each notification must reflect data which is both accurate and consistent.

(41.4) Level of Command. Only the generic level of command, e.g., division, corps, or army, will be given.

(41.5) Start and end dates.

(a) For land forces exercises (42.1), the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the first phase of the activity, whether troop strength has not yet breached the notification thresholds of 9,000 troops or 250 tanks on that day. This is typically the first day of the deployment phase, the day the first soldiers depart garrisons for the purpose of participating in the notifiable exercise. The end date will be the last day of the redeployment or recovery phase.

(b) For amphibious landings and parachute assaults (42.2), the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the first phase of the activity, regardless whether the troop strength has breached the notification thresholds on that day. This is the first day the first soldier or marine lands on the drop zone or beach. The end date for an independent amphibious landing or parachute drop exercise is the completion of the redeployment or recovery phase. For an exercise that becomes part of a land force exercise, the end date is the date the land force exercise begins.

(c) For concentrations, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day that the notification threshold is breached. There is not a concentration nor an arrival, by definition, until the thresholds are breached. Therefore, the 42-day clock begins running from the date that thresholds are to be breached and ends when the troop strength drops below notification thresholds.

(42.1) through (42.1.12) apply only to military activities notifiable under subparagraph (38.1).

(a) Subparagraph (42.1.1) includes all personnel pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area. This requirement should include troops pre-positioned ashore as well as support and safety personnel ashore supporting the amphibious landing. For example, if 3,500 troops come across the beach in the amphibious landing and another 3,000 were pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area to participate in or support the landing, a total of 6,500 troops would be reported as the number involved in the amphibious landing, i.e., come across the beach.

(42.1.5) Helicopters. Use CFE categories.

(42.1.6) Aircraft sorties (if notifiable) include sorties by naval aircraft in support of the notifiable ground activity. Helicopters are not included in this category; their number is reported per (42.1.5). Note that subparagraphs (42.1.6) through (42.1.9) pertain only to the category of activities outlined in paragraph (42.1). Therefore, this subparagraph does not pertain to parachute assaults.

(42.1.7) Purpose of air missions will be listed in the generic sense, e.g., close air support or reconnaissance. The class of air mission termed "battlefield air interdiction" (BAI) will not be listed; "air-to-ground" will be used instead.

(42.1.8) Use generic terms for categories of aircraft (e.g., bomber, reconnaissance, or fighter).

(42.1.9) Use generic terms for levels of command (e.g., squadron, wing, or allied air force).

(42.1.10) Any naval ship-to-shore gunfire should be so noted. This is a "yes" or "no" item. There is no requirement to notify simulated ship-to-shore gunfire.

(42.1.11) Indicate naval ship-to-shore support with a "yes" or "no." Again, this subparagraph does not apply to exclusively amphibious activities.

(42.1.12) Use generic levels of command (e.g., fleet, flotilla, squadron). There is no requirement to provide the numbered fleet, or a more precise level of command (e.g., Commander, Naval Forces Atlantic).

(42.2) The amphibious landings and parachute assaults described here are single-phase activities that are not, in the traditional sense, land force activities, although they may be related to other activities.

(42.2.1) This reference applies only to the troops who actually participate in a ground force activity resulting from an amphibious landing or parachute assault, i.e., only those troops who ultimately become land forces following completion of the amphibious or parachute assault. Air sections that do not come ashore and sea components of these activities are not notifiable.

(42.2.2) The points of embarkation refer only to those start points in the CSBM zone. Do not report embarkation points outside the zone.

(42.3) Normally, the U.S. will not notify an arrival of troops from the continental U.S., since arrival points are usually military garrisons. The likelihood of 9,000 troops landing at a civil air terminal or port at any time is very

remote. The U.S. will notify subsequent concentrations or activities if they breach thresholds and meet other notifiable criteria.

(42.3.2) Use generic types of divisions (e.g., elements of one mechanized infantry division).

(42.3.3) Although the VDOC 92 does not require a break out of tanks by each participating state, this information is to be provided in U.S. channels to assist in identifying total participation.

(42.3.4) Define a box delimited by geographical coordinates (with names of corresponding towns) that will cover the activity area, while not providing specific locations of garrisons, ports, and points of arrival. Component command input to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 (info ECJ5), will include the actual arrival points, concentration area(s), and POMCUS sites being used.

(43.2 and 43.3) These two subparagraphs pertain to all types of notifications and require the activity to be subdivided into principal phases of the activity, to include a brief description of the activity and its corresponding dates. For example: "Active Exercise Phase: Elements of friendly forces counter-attack enemy positions, 7-9 Aug, conduct a defensive action, and prepare for a major follow-on counterattack of enemy positions."

(44.2) This subparagraph refers to activities such as the connection of the REFORGER deployment concentration to the follow-on active exercise.

(45.4) When a notifiable military activity exceeds the threshold of 13,000 troops (3,500 in a parachute assault or amphibious landing), or when the number of battle tanks engaged exceeds 300, then that activity is categorized as "observable." Observations are sometimes termed "active," when a state sends representatives to observe, or "passive," when a state hosts observers from other states. In addition, concentrations that meet or exceed 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks are observable only during the period that one or both of these thresholds are exceeded. Arrivals are not notified or observed when the arrival points are at military garrisons or military airfields which are protected as sensitive points. When these forces depart their garrisons and concentrate in the field, or participate in an otherwise observable activity, then an observation is required. Transfers of troops (i.e., movements) into or within the CSBM zone are not notifiable, except when they meet the criteria for notifiable concentrations. Civilian airports and seaports are "in the field." If this activity exceeds 13,000 troops, then it becomes an observable activity.

(47) The host state can delegate all or a portion of the observation program to the state conducting the activity. In most cases, the U.S. will coordinate closely with the Allies in

allocating responsibilities for a joint observation program. Should matters needing interpretation arise, the host state will decide the matter, unless this responsibility has been delegated by the host state to the U.S. for U.S. activities.

(51) Concurrent with the notification of an observable military activity, the host state (i.e., the state on whose territory the activity will take place) will invite observers from the other participating states via diplomatic channels. The receiving state will have twenty-one days from the date of the invitation to respond via diplomatic channels with the names and ranks of the observers. Affirmative responses not received within twenty-one days can be denied, but in practice are generally accepted.

(a) The Joint Staff will provide the State Department with the names of two U.S. observers in time for the invitation response to reach the hosting state by the suspense date. Normally, USEUCOM will provide the senior observer and the USDAO in the host state will provide the other observer. The Joint Staff reserves the right to designate one or both observers.

(b) Component commands will provide HQ USEUCOM, ECJ5-F the following personal data on their nominees when requested: name; rank; date/place of birth; passport number; place/date of issue (passport); travel arrangements to include airline, flight number, and time/place of arrival. Only the information on travel arrangements can be provided outside the 21-day response time if unavailable at the time.

(52) through (64) Observation program. Further guidance on the observation program is in Appendix F.

(52) The host state must invite observers and publish the observation program; however, the host state can delegate the actual execution of the observation program to the state conducting the activity (paragraph (47)).

(52.6) Special instructions must be included in the invitation to observers regarding the use of special equipment.

(52.7) Inclement weather gear will be provided to all observers when necessary.

(54) Alerts are not observable unless they meet or exceed an observation threshold and also extend beyond seventy-two hours. The observable portion of an alert is only that portion that extends beyond seventy-two hours.

(61.3) In a change from the Stockholm Document, observers are guaranteed the right to use their own cameras, binoculars, and other equipment, subject to inspection by the host state.

(65) to (70) Annual Calendars. Each participating state is

required to provide an annual calendar to all participating states NLT 15 November of each year. (See Appendix D.)

(a) The annual calendar is a forecast. Detailed information, especially on multinational exercises, may not be completely available in time for the annual calendar submission. Component commands will submit the best information available at the time.

(b) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved (alerts) are not forecast on the annual calendar.

(71.1) Any exercise involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks must be forecast in the advance (2-year) forecast for the year following that covered by the annual calendar. Each participating state can carry out only one such exercise every two years. If, for some reason, the exercise could not be forecast in advance as required, it can still be conducted, so long as it is carried in the annual calendar for the year it will be conducted, but cannot exceed 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks. (Paragraph (73) prohibits the conduct of an activity of more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks unless it is listed in the previous two annual calendars).

(71.2) Each participating state is allowed up to six exercises with more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks per calendar year. Of these six exercises, only three may have more than 25,000 troops or 400 battle tanks. There is no numerical restriction on exercises below 13,000 troops or involving fewer than 300 battle tanks.

(71.3) No participating states may have more than three exercises going on at the same time if they involve more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks.

(72) and (73) Exercises involving over 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks must be included in two consecutive annual calendars by both the host state and the state with the threshold number of troops and tanks in the exercise.

(75) to (142) Compliance and Verification. These paragraphs represent the actions the USG may take in monitoring another state's compliance with the VDOC 92. Inspections and evaluations are sometimes termed "active" from the standpoint of the inspecting state and "passive" from the stand point of the inspected state. The following key points are worthy of special emphasis.

(77) Inviting inspectors from other participating states is voluntary. The Crisis Prevention Center Consultative Committee (CPCCC) in Vienna will determine whether inspectors from other participating states should be invited to participate in an inspection, and if so, which states are to be part of the multi-

national team.

(78) When a participating state's compliance with VDOC 92 is in doubt, USG policy is to state "Paragraph 78 of the Vienna Document 1992" as the reason for requesting an inspection. This reason is entered in subparagraph 90.1 of the inspection request.

(81) The term force majeure is synonymous with natural disaster (e.g., earthquake, flood), extreme weather (e.g., hurricane), or manmade disaster (e.g., Chernobyl nuclear accident). Any decision involving force majeure during an on-site inspection of U.S. troops will be in consultation with HQ US-EUCOM, ECJ5, and the Joint Staff.

(86) The VDOC 92 highlights some of the areas categorized as sensitive points and restricted areas. Command posts, fire direction centers, communications vans, and the like are considered sensitive points and, therefore, not subject to inspection. Some such points are more sensitive than others. For example, an inspector could view the command post complex (i.e., the array of tents) but would not be permitted access to the inside of the command post. On the other hand, a field-deployed Hawk or Patriot missile site, in its entirety, would constitute a sensitive point. Although there is no official agreement on the stand-off distance to such a sensitive point, it is generally accepted within NATO that very sensitive missile sites will have, nominally, an exclusion zone of 1-kilometer in radius from ground inspection and a 5-kilometer radius for aerial inspection. At the present time, no photography is allowed within these exclusion zones.

(88) The host state (receiving the inspection) will normally provide transportation for the entire inspection period. The host may request that the USG provide two helicopters and two ground vehicles for the escort and inspection team during the entire time the U.S. troops are being inspected. Since the U.S. cannot be a host state for an inspection, we are not obligated to provide such equipment.

(89) There are no provisions in the VDOC 92 for third-country liaison teams to accompany the escort and inspection party. Agreements have been reached, however, with many NATO Allies to allow a U.S. liaison team to coordinate with and accompany host state escorts during the period when U.S. troops are being inspected. The terms of the liaison mission will be determined by the host state, or by applicable bilateral agreements, and adhered to by U.S. personnel. The USG position is that OSIA will provide liaison teams to U.S. forces whenever such forces may be inspected.

(90.9) Not applicable unless another participating state has been invited.

(96) If another participating state has been invited, the

number of inspectors from that state cannot exceed the number from the inviting state.

(100) Providing a map of the specified area to inspectors is voluntary. Equipment should not be taken from the inspector for examination out of his sight nor dismantled in any way. Should an objection be raised regarding a particular device because it is not listed in the VDOC 92, or because, even when listed, it is being used for purposes not connected with the VDOC 92, the OSIA representative will address the issue with the inspection team chief for immediate resolution. If the issue cannot be resolved in this manner, the inspectors should agree not to employ that device during the inspection, with the understanding that the incident would likely be pursued through diplomatic channels.

(103) A briefing is not intended to be used to delay the inspection. Inspectors are only required to take into consideration host-country suggestions as to the advisability of a pre-inspection briefing. There is no requirement for inspectors to receive a briefing, even when offered, if it is not their wish.

(a) Care must be taken to ensure the host state's sensitivities toward sovereignty are not questioned.

(b) Any differences of interpretation encountered during the inspection will be decided by the host state, except where applicable bilateral agreements give this right to the U.S. The circumstances and the rationale for the differing interpretations will be captured in a memorandum for record and passed through HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECJ5-F, to the Joint Staff.

(114) This paragraph depicts the mathematical formula for determining the number and source of evaluation visits a signatory state is obligated to receive. Actual quotas for the following year will not be known until after the information exchange on 15 December, valid as of 1 January. Paragraph (11.1.1) requires each state to include a statement indicating the total number of units contained in the information exchange and the resultant annual evaluation quota. The USG is currently obliged to accept no more than one such visit per year within the ATTU.

(116) Annual evaluations for U.S. forces generated by current force levels could be conducted in any country in the zone where there are U.S. combat forces; i.e., not just in the FRG.

(117) through (118.5) Describe the nature of the request. Unlike inspections, no reason for the evaluation request is required.

(121) It is important that coordination and consultation between the host and stationing state precede the issuance of the reply. In accordance with agreements with states in which U.S.

forces are stationed, the U.S. will be in charge during the actual evaluation visit to U.S. forces. The host state has the responsibility for the evaluation team prior to the start of the evaluation and immediately following the conclusion of the evaluation visit.

(123) Nonacceptance of an evaluation visit means that the unit is in its normal peacetime location, but the host state (or stationing state through the host state) has elected to use one of its entitlements to not accept the visit. Nonacceptance is ultimately an option to postpone. In the case of U.S.-stationed forces, a nonacceptance decision would be communicated to the host state during consultations before the reply. The five times for an aggregate of no more than thirty days counts against the state whose forces are the object of the evaluation request and not against the host state.

(124) If a unit is out-of-garrison during the period of a proposed evaluation, the requested state may still insist and be granted a visit to the empty normal peacetime location of the requested formation or unit, or the requested state may grant a visit to the unit in the field.

(126) "Place of assembly of the team" in the discussion of points of entry provides the possibility of using an in-country attache or embassy officer dealing with military matters as an evaluator.

(129) Auxiliary personnel should always be identified as interpreters on the request message.

(131) and (132) The visit begins with the briefing, not with the arrival of the team in country. This procedure allows the option of a team arriving on one day and conducting the evaluation on the next.

(131.1) The only requirement on a receiving and/or requested state during the evaluation of a formation is to provide a briefing. Beyond that, the receiving and/or requested state may provide the possibility to see (and by implication, evaluators may ask to see) any of the formation's immediately subordinate elements that were not reported separately (e.g., noncombat units and other subordinate elements).

(132.2) With the exception of sensitive points and sub-elements that are not in their normal peacetime locations, personnel, weapons, and equipment should be available for evaluation. Commanders are not required to disrupt training or stage special training exercises for the evaluators.

(133) Participating states have a right to restrict access to sensitive points, facilities, and equipment. Participating states are under an obligation to keep the number to a minimum.

(138) Receiving states are required to ensure that evaluated state personnel understand the status, rights, and responsibilities of receiving and hosting representatives in order to prevent embarrassment and unsafe situations.

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Appendix D

Sample Annual Calendar and Forecast

HQ USEUCOM DRAFT Annual Calendar for 199X

1. A (partial) draft VDOC 92 annual calendar of military activity is submitted below, as a sample. It includes the forecast of activities for the following year to which the constraining provisions of the VDOC 92 apply. In addition, USEUCOM input includes U.S. participation which is in itself not notifiable, but which, when added to input from other countries, may contribute to making an Allied activity notifiable.

2. In accordance with paragraph (67), VDOC 92, the calendar of forecasted activity is provided.

a. Winter Warrior III.

(1) 67.1: Type of military activity and its designation; Field training exercise Winter Warrior III.

(2) 67.2: General characteristics and purpose of military activity: To exercise selected mission essential tasks at division level.

(3) 67.3: States involved in the military activity: United States.

(4) 67.4: Area of the military activity, indicated by geographic features where appropriate and defined by geographic coordinates:

Steinach (50 Deg 13 Min N, 10 Deg 04 Min E);
Kitzingen (49 Deg 40 Min N, 10 Deg 08 Min E);
Muenchsteinach (49 Deg 38 Min N, 10 Deg 27 Min E);
Ansbach (49 Deg 19 Min N, 10 Deg 35 Min E);
Doerzbach (49 Deg 23 Min N, 09 Deg 42 Min E);
Miltenberg (49 Deg 39 Min N, 09 Deg 13 Min E);
Hanau (50 Deg 09 Min N, 08 Deg 56 Min E).

(5) 67.5: Planned duration of the military activity, indicated by envisioned start and end dates: 7 days, 10-24 Jan 199X.

(6) 67.6: The envisaged total number of troops engaged in the military activity. For activities involving more than one State, the host State will provide such information for each State involved: 15,000 U.S. soldiers.

(7) 67.7: The types of armed forces involved in the military activity: Ground and air.

(8) 67.8: The envisaged level of the military activity and designation of direct operational command under which the military activity will take place: Division.

(9) 67.9: The number and type of divisions envisaged in the military activity: Elements of one mechanized infantry division.

(10) 67.10: Any additional information concerning, inter alia, components of armed forces, which the participating state planning the military activity considers relevant: as appropriate.

b. Cold Winter.

(1) 67.1: Cold Winter; medium scale FTX.

(2) 67.2: Exercise forces in operations under winter conditions; Norwegian North Brigade, other Norwegian Army, Air Force, and Naval units.

(3) 67.3: Norway, United States.

(4) 67.4: Central and North Norway, centered on: Trundelay (63 Deg 30 Min N, 10 Deg 30 Min E); Bordufod (68 Deg 50 Min N, 18 Deg 20 Min E); Bodo (67 Deg 20 Min N, 14 Deg 35 Min N).

(5) 67.5: 10 days, 27 Feb-22 Mar 199X.

(6) 67.6: 6,000 U.S. Marines.

(7) 67.7: Ground, naval, and air forces.

(8) 67.8: Norway Air-Landed (NAL) Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

(9) 67.9: MEB and Commander, North Norway (COMMON).

(10) 67.10: N/A.

c. Caravan Guard.

(1) 67.1: Command Field Exercise; Caravan Guard.

(2) 67.2: Force-on-force exercise to train division,

brigade, and battalion staffs.

(3) 67.3: United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

(4) 67.4: Following is active exercise phase area, which does not include deployment phase area:
Nord Kruchfen (51 Deg 12 Min M, 06 Deg 14 Min E);
Meerbusch (51 Deg 14 Min N, 06 Deg 39 Min E);
Bendorf (50 Deg 24 Min N, 07 Deg 32 Min E);
Trier (49 Deg 46 Min N, 06 Deg 38 Min E);
Schleiden (50 Deg 31 Min N, 06 Deg 25 Min E);
Herzogen (50 Deg 53 Min N, 06 Deg 10 Min E);
Follow highway 221 to 51 Deg 12 Min N, 06 Deg 14 Min E.

(5) 67.5: 22 days, 8-22 Mar 199X.

(6) 67.6: 30,000 (27,000 U.S., 3,000 FRG).

(7) 67.7: Ground and air.

(8) 67.8: Corps.

(9) 67.9: Elements of one U.S. armor division and elements of one U.S. mechanized infantry division.

(10) 67.10: Portions of two FRG brigades will participate.

d. Unnamed REFORGER-related FTX.

(1) 67.1: Field training exercise; unnamed.

(2) 67.2: Exercise U.S. deployed and European-based army forces, as well as NATO forces, in command and control, interoperability, and operations on joint and combined battlefield.

(3) 67.3: United States, FRG, others TBD.

(4) 67.4: Following is the active exercise phase area, which does not include deployment phase:
Marsberg (51 Deg 25 Min N, 08 Deg 51 Min N);
Friedland (51 Deg 25 Min N, 09 Deg 54 Min N);
Ermershausen (50 Deg 13 Min N, 10 Deg 37 Min E);
Karlstadt (49 Deg 58 Min N, 09 Deg 45 Min E);
Grossostheim (49 Deg 55 Min N, 09 Deg 05 Min E);
Wetzlar (50 Deg 33 Min N, 08 Deg 30 Min E).

(5) 67.5: 14 days, 5-19 September 199X.

(6) 67.6: 50,000 U.S. soldiers. Others TBD. Air sorties may exceed 200.

(7) 67.7: Ground and air.

(8) 67.8: Theater Army.

(9) 67.9: Elements of two U.S. armor divisions and elements of two U.S. mechanized infantry divisions.

(10) 67.10: FTX is associated with annual U.S. REFORGER reinforcement exercise. REFORGER itself will involve the return of approximately 14,500 U.S. troops to Europe who will arrive and move independently to the designated area where they will fall under control of the corps to which assigned for the exercise. Until they come under control of V Corps, they will not be organized under single operational control in numbers large enough to require notification. Post-FTX redeployment will involve 14,500 troops moving independently to ports for the return to CONUS. Troops arriving from and departing to CONUS will move through sea and airports yet to be determined in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Approximately 3,000 of these troops will remain at arrival ports to receive and transfer equipment during the exercise. REFORGER FTX concepts are being reviewed due to a change in training philosophy. Exercise may change in number of participants, as plans are refined.

3. In accordance with paragraph (71), military activities meeting constraining provision thresholds for 199X are provided.

a. Description: Field training exercise; REFORGER-related exercise.

(1) General Purpose: Exercise U.S. deployed and European based army forces with NATO forces in large scale field training maneuvers.

(2) Time frame and duration: 14 days, 1-15 Feb 199X.

(3) Area: Southern and Central FRG.

(4) Size: 80,000 U.S. troops.

(5) States involved: United States; others to be determined.

b. Description: Field training exercise; Caravan Guard.

(1) General Purpose: Force-on-force exercise to train V Corps units.

(2) Time frame and duration: 14 days, 1-15 Sep 199X.

(3) Area: Central Federal Republic of Germany.

(4) Size: 50,000 U.S. soldiers.

(5) States involved: United States; others to be

determined.

4. Following information, while not notifiable by itself, is provided on USEUCOM elements participating in Allied military activities in which Allied troop totals could exceed notification thresholds in 199X. Format in accordance with model in paragraph 67.

a. Wintex-Cimex.

- (1) 67.1: Command post exercise.
- (2) 67.2: To exercise certain aspects of operating command establishments during periods of crisis.
- (3) 67.3: United States; other NATO states.
- (4) 67.4: ACE-wide.
- (5) 67.5: 24 Feb-9 Mar 199X.
- (6) 67.6: 4,500 U.S. soldiers, off-garrison, in FRG.
- (7) 67.7: Air (air activity simulated).
- (8) 67.8: SACEUR.
- (9) 67.9: N/A.
- (10) 67.10: N/A.
- (11) U.S. activity alone is not notifiable.

b. Dragon Hammer.

- (1) 67.1: Dragon Hammer, medium scale NATO FTX.
- (2) 67.2: To test Southern Region NATO HQS and assigned forces.
- (3) 67.3: Italy, United States.
- (4) 67.4: Capo Teulada, Sardinia, centered on 38 Deg 50 Min N, 09 Deg 00 Min E.
- (5) 67.5: 12 days, late April to early May 199X.
- (6) 67.6: 2,021 U.S. Marines; number of amphibious forces ashore will not exceed 3,000.
- (7) 67.7: Ground forces.
- (8) 67.8: Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
- (9) 67.9: Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

(10) 67.10: N/A.

End sample format of annual calendar and forecast.

Appendix E

Notification

E-1. General. This appendix establishes procedures to ensure required VDOC 92 notifications are properly submitted.

E-2. Responsibilities.

a. HQ USEUCOM. Ensure coordination between HQ USEUCOM staff elements and component commands is sufficient to accurately forecast notifiable activities on the annual calendar by 15 November and to properly notify the activities forty-two days prior to the start dates.

b. Component commands. Provide notification data to HQ USEUCOM, ECJ3 and ECJ5, in the format described in paragraphs (41) through (44.2) of the VDOC 92 NLT seventy-seven days prior to the start date of the notifiable activity, and in the case of REFORGER or other land force exercises in which forces arrive and/or concentrate in theater from outside the VDOC 92 zone, NLT eighty-seven days prior to the start of the exercise. Formats are provided in Annexes I through III. Start date is the first day of the deployment phase, as explained in Appendix C. Draft notifications for notifiable alerts are due to HQ USEUCOM nine days prior to initiation of the alert. In addition to the notification information called for in the VDOC 92 formats, provide the following information which will be used by the USG to define the geographic areas for each phase of the exercise:

(1) POMCUS or CEGE sites (by town name and geographic coordinates) from which equipment will be drawn or turned-in. In addition, affected component command should track, but need not report, draw and turn-in schedules, including number of troops and tanks processing through each site each day of use. This information must be available to U.S. escorts in the event of a VDOC 92 inspection of the activity.

(2) Aerial and sea points of entry to and departure from the VDOC 92 zone (by name and geographic coordinates), indication of whether these ports are military or civilian ports (military installations are exempt from observation or inspection) and inclusive dates of use. In addition, affected component command should track, but need not report, number of troops and tanks to arrive or depart each day at each port.

(3) Any arrival/departure, concentration, or deploy-

ment/redeployment activity associated with the notifiable activity involving U.S. forces which is to take place in third countries other than the country in which the active exercise will occur. If so, report locations, inclusive dates, and projected troop/tank strength.

(4) Air sorties projected, according to plans of the ground component, and the number of sorties allocated by the regional Primary Subordinate Command (PSC) -- AIRCENT, AIRSOUTH, 5 ATAF, OR 6 ATAF. Component commands will provide best information available at time of the notification and update as changes occur. Information will also address whether any sorties are to be purely for simulation purposes. HQ USEUCOM draft input to the Joint Staff will include figures from the ground force component and Allied tactical air force figures reported by HQ USAFE. To permit operators the maximum flexibility, HQ USEUCOM will recommend the higher figures be included on the notification to other participating states.

Annex I

Appendix E (Notification)

Sample Format--REFORGER Deployment Concentration Notification

Paragraphs are keyed to the format in the VDOC 92. Paragraph descriptions are repeated here for clarity.

41.1: The designation of the military activity: REFORGER 199X.

41.2: The general purpose of the military activity: To exercise deployment of United States armed forces.

41.3: The names of the states involved in the military activity: United States.

41.4: The level of command organizing and commanding the military activity: Theater Army.

41.5: The start and end dates of the military activity: September 6, 199X - September 15, 199X.

42 through 42.2.2: Not applicable to concentration activity.

42.3: The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating states in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBM to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBM to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

42.3.1: The total number of troops transferred: 35,000 troops.

42.3.2: Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer: Elements of two mechanized infantry divisions and elements of one armored division.

42.3.3: The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration: 267 battle tanks.

42.3.4: Geographic coordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration:

- 52 Deg 26 Min N, 07 Deg 17 Min E;
- 52 Deg 26 Min N, 08 Deg 36 Min E;
- 51 Deg 40 Min N, 08 Deg 22 Min E;
- 51 Deg 42 Min N, 07 Deg 55 Min E;
- 51 Deg 37 Min N, 07 Deg 30 Min E;
- 51 Deg 44 Min N, 07 Deg 10 Min E.

43.1: The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate:

- Bernte (52 Deg 26 Min N, 07 Deg 17 Min E);
- Rahden (52 Deg 26 Min N, 08 Deg 36 Min E);
- Lippstadt (51 Deg 40 Min N, 08 Deg 22 Min E);
- Werries (51 Deg 42 Min N, 07 Deg 55 Min E);
- Lumen (51 Deg 37 Min N, 07 Deg 30 Min E);
- Haltern (51 Deg 44 Min N, 07 Deg 17 Min E).

43.2: The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate: Having transferred to Europe, United States forces deploy, during the period August 22 to September 11, 199X, from region defined by

- 51 Deg 44 Min N, 04 Deg 30 Min E;
- 50 Deg 50 Min N, 04 Deg 20 Min E;
- 50 Deg 35 Min N, 07 Deg 03 Min E;
- 51 Deg 20 Min N, 09 Deg 30 Min E;
- 52 Deg 22 Min N, 09 Deg 45 Min E;
- 53 Deg 33 Min N, 08 Deg 34 Min E;
- 52 Deg 21 Min N, 04 Deg 59 Min E;

To engage in a notifiable concentration from September 6 through September 13, 199X, in the following area in order to organize into division and brigade formations and prepare for follow-on field training exercise:

- 52 Deg 26 Min N, 07 Deg 17 Min E;
- 52 Deg 26 Min N, 08 Deg 36 Min E;
- 51 Deg 40 Min N, 08 Deg 22 Min E;
- 51 Deg 42 Min N, 07 Deg 55 Min E;
- 51 Deg 37 Min N, 07 Deg 30 Min E;
- 51 Deg 44 Min N, 07 Deg 10 Min E.

43.3: Brief description of each phase: U.S. forces use land

and rail transport to concentrate in assembly areas and make preparations for follow-on field training exercise.

44.1: Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity: Exercise area has been changed slightly to reflect refinements in exercise planning.

44.2: Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities: REFORGER 199X precedes exercise Certain Strike which will be notified separately.

Additional information to be provided by component commands: (1) POMCUS sites with geographic coordinates and names, inclusive dates of use; (2) aerial and seaports of entry with geographic coordinates and names, inclusive dates used; and (3) any other information which will assist HQ USEUCOM and the Joint Staff in correctly notifying the activity taking place. Component commands should closely track movement of personnel and equipment through ports and from/to POMCUS sites and be prepared to provide this information to explain notification information ambiguities; this information also will be required in the event of an inspection of the activity.

End of sample notification format for concentration.

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Annex II

Appendix E (Notification)

Sample Format for Active Exercise Notification

41.1: The designation of the military activity: Exercise CERTAIN STRIKE.

41.2: The general purpose of the military activity: To exercise Allied forces in combined operations in the field.

41.3: The names of the states involved in the military activity: United States, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, and France.

41.4: The level of command organizing and commanding the military activity: Army.

41.5: The start and end dates of the military activity: September 14, 199X - September 25, 199X.

42.1: The engagement of formations of land forces of the

participating states in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

42.1.1: The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each state involved, if applicable: 78,000 total troops (35,000 U.S.; 19,000 FRG; 7,000 UK; 11,000 Netherlands; 6,000 Belgium; 120 French).

42.1.2: The designation, subordination, number and type of formations and units participating for each state down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level: Elements of two mechanized infantry divisions (U.S.), elements of one armored division (U.S.), elements of one armored division (FRG), elements of one mechanized division (NL).

42.1.3: The total number of battle tanks for each state and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armored vehicles: 668 main battle tanks (267 U.S.; 155 FRG; 114 UK; 52 NL; 80 Belgium); 592 anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armored vehicles.

42.1.4: The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100mm caliber or above): 227 total artillery pieces (100mm and above); 26 multiple launch rocket systems.

42.1.5: The total number of helicopters, by category: 383 total helicopters (149 attack, 234 utility and transport).

42.1.6: Envisaged numbers of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters: 550 sorties by aircraft.

42.1.7: Purpose of air missions: Close air support, air to ground, electronic warfare, transport, aerial reconnaissance.

42.1.8: Categories of aircraft involved: Fighter, attack, bomber, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, transport.

42.1.9: The level of command, organizing and commanding the air force participation: Allied tactical air force.

42.1.10 to 42.3.4: Not applicable.

43.1: The area of military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate:

Lingen (52 Deg 30 Min N, 07 Deg 20 Min E);
Harbergen (52 Deg 43 Min N, 09 Deg 00 Min E);
Bucholz (53 Deg 21 Min N, 09 Deg 46 Min E);
Dannenberg (53 Deg 05 Min N, 11 Deg 03 Min E);
Wieren (52 Deg 52 Min N, 10 Deg 42 Min E);
Lehre (52 Deg 20 Min N, 10 Deg 40 Min E);
Laatzen (52 Deg 19 Min N, 09 Deg 47 Min E);

Lippstadt (52 Deg 40 Min N, 08 Deg 22 Min E);
Haltern (52 Deg 44 Min N, 07 Deg 10 Min E).

43.2: The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical coordinates) for each phase:

Deployment: (September 14-15) Forces move from garrisons and pre-exercise staging areas in region defined by:

51 Deg 44 Min N, 04 Deg 30 Min E;
50 Deg 50 Min N, 04 Deg 20 Min E;
50 Deg 35 Min N, 07 Deg 03 Min E;
50 Deg 10 Min N, 08 Deg 40 Min E;
53 Deg 33 Min N, 08 Deg 43 Min E;
52 Deg 21 Min N, 04 Deg 59 Min E;

to exercise starting positions at:

52 Deg 30 Min N, 07 Deg 20 Min E;
52 Deg 43 Min N, 09 Deg 00 Min E;
52 Deg 19 Min N, 09 Deg 00 Min E;
51 Deg 40 Min N, 08 Deg 22 Min E;
51 Deg 44 Min N, 07 Deg 10 Min E;

Active Exercise: (September 16-24) Forces conduct field training exercise in region defined by:

52 Deg 43 Min N, 09 Deg 00 Min E;
53 Deg 21 Min N, 09 Deg 46 Min E;
53 Deg 05 Min N, 11 Deg 03 Min E;
52 Deg 51 Min N, 10 Deg 42 Min E;
52 Deg 20 Min N, 10 Deg 40 Min E;
52 Deg 19 Min N, 09 Deg 47 Min E;

Recovery: (September 24-25) Forces return to garrisons and post-exercise assembly areas in region defined by:

51 Deg 44 Min N, 04 Deg 30 Min E;
50 Deg 50 Min N, 04 Deg 01 Min E;
50 Deg 35 Min N, 07 Deg 03 Min E;
50 Deg 10 Min N, 08 Deg 40 Min E;
53 Deg 30 Min N, 08 Deg 34 Min E;
52 Deg 21 Min N, 04 Deg 59 Min E.

43.3: Brief description of each phase:

Deployment: Reinforcing forces move from staging areas while other friendly forces establish defensive positions against attacking forces.

Active Exercise: Elements of friendly forces counterattack enemy positions, conduct a defensive action, and prepare for follow-on major counterattack of enemy positions.

Recovery: Using various means of transport, forces move from their assembly areas to their garrisons or redeployment points of concentration.

44.1: Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity: Modifications to the exercise area reflect refinements in exercise planning.

44.2: Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities: Exercise CERTAIN STRIKE is the follow-on field training exercise to REFORGER 199X. CERTAIN STRIKE will be followed by a redeployment concentration which will be notified under separate cover.

Additional information to be provided by component commands: (1) Concentration assembly areas, airfields, and seaports from which units deploy or to which they will return after the activity; (2) POMCUS sites, if used, with inclusive dates used, and (3) any other information which will assist HQ USEUCOM and the Joint Staff in correctly notifying the activity taking place.

End of sample format for active exercise notification.

Annex III

Appendix E (Notification)

Sample Amphibious Landing Notification

The notification is keyed to the relevant paragraphs of the VDOC 92.

41.1: The designation of the military activity: Exercise DRAGON HAMMER 199X.

41.2: The general purpose of the military activity: Amphibious training exercise.

41.3: The names of the States involved in the military activity: United States, Italy, France, UK, and Netherlands.

41.4: The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity: Fleet Commander.

41.5: The start and end dates of the military activity; 1 May 199X - 7 May 199X.

42.1 through 42.1.12: Not applicable.

42.2: The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone

of application for CSBMs:

42.2.1: The total number of troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults: 3,015 (1,300 U.S.; 300 FR; 820 UK; 125 NL; 470 IT).

42.2.2: In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs: Brindisi (Italy); Marchwood and Rosyth (UK); Vlissingen (NL); Toulon (FR). (Note: Troops who embarked in the United States are not included in this sub-paragraph, since the U.S. is not inside the VDOC 92 zone of application).

42.3 through 42.3.4: Not applicable.

43.1: The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate. The exercise will take place in the Capo Teulada area of Sardinia, delimited by the following geographic coordinates:

38 Deg 59 Min N, 08 Deg 30 Min E;
38 Deg 58 Min N, 08 Deg 43 Min E;
38 Deg 55 Min N, 08 Deg 42 Min E;
38 Deg 56 Min N, 08 Deg 32 Min E;
and along the Sardinia coast line.

43.2: The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical coordinates) for each phase:

Deployment Phase: Having disembarked (1 May 199X) from the points of embarkation above, NATO forces deploy to region delimited by:

38 Deg 59 Min N, 08 Deg 30 Min E;
38 Deg 58 Min N, 08 Deg 43 Min E;
38 Deg 55 Min N, 08 Deg 42 Min E;
38 Deg 56 Min N, 08 Deg 32 Min E;
Sardinia coast line.

Active Exercise Phase: Then engages in a notifiable amphibious landing (2-6 May 1988) in region delimited by:

38 Deg 59 Min N, 08 Deg 30 Min E;
38 Deg 58 Min N, 08 Deg 43 Min E;
38 Deg 55 Min N, 08 Deg 42 Min E;
38 Deg 56 Min N, 08 Deg 32 Min E;
Sardinia coast line.

Recovery Phase: Re-embarks (7 May 199X) from the exercise in region delimited by:

38 Deg 59 Min N, 08 Deg 30 Min E;

38 Deg 58 Min N, 08 Deg 43 Min E;
38 Deg 55 Min N, 08 Deg 42 Min E;
38 Deg 56 Min N, 08 Deg 32 Min E;
Sardinia coast line.

43.3: Brief description of each phase:

Deployment: Troops board amphibious vessels and deploy to exercise area.

Active Exercise: Troops conduct assault landing in waves, attack limited objectives, and secure beachhead.

Recovery: Troops clean and maintain equipment and assemble for re-embarkation to starting points.

44.1: Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity: This amphibious landing was not originally forecast in the annual calendar and is now being notified due to unexpected increase in Allied troop participation.

44.2: Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities: None.

End of sample format for notification of amphibious activity.

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Appendix F

Liaison Team

F-1. Liaison. As national command element for U.S. forces in theater, HQ USEUCOM ensures full USG compliance with the VDOC 92. This responsibility includes assistance in safeguarding U.S. and NATO interests during inspections in the West. The fluid nature of application of the VDOC 92, intentionally vague language in some provisions, uneven familiarity of U.S. forces with the inspection process, deficiency in language qualifications, and need to standardize inspection procedures call for the presence of liaison officers, provided by OSIA and USEUCOM, during passive inspections. USEUCOM personnel who assist the OSIA liaison team also must be familiar with the VDOC 92 and USG policy on its application, but must be particularly knowledgeable on participating U.S. forces and planned exercise activity. Liaison teams will be provided to U.S. forces participating in exercises whenever possible.

- a. The host nation (HN) is responsible for hosting the

inspection, including escorting the inspectors, but the U.S. may be asked to provide assistance with this task. Component commands will be informed of such requirements as soon as possible.

b. With HN concurrence, the U.S. may be invited to join and accompany the escort team. Otherwise, an OSIA liaison team will be sent to U.S. forces locations in the inspection specified area. In either case, the team mission is to provide guidance to U.S. forces on compliance with the VDOC 92. The team will establish liaison with HN officials, provide them data on sensitive and restricted U.S. installations and activities, and assist as requested. Depending on HN escort team reaction, the role of the team should then become subordinate in nature, remaining at the command post/element of the senior U.S. commander or other location as the commander directs to be able to field questions and provide advice on any situation that may arise. The liaison team will be sensitive to HN sovereignty and prerogatives, and the team should be referred to as liaison officers rather than escorts. The liaison team has every right to be present when U.S. forces are encountered during the inspection, but will not attempt to shadow the escort party if not invited to do so by the HN. Liaison officers will not initiate direct contact with inspectors without consent of HN escort officers. The team may use cameras and dictaphones to record inspector contacts with U.S. forces. The liaison team will submit an after action report through U.S. channels documenting the liaison mission.

(1) The liaison team composition will be determined by OSIA, but will normally consist of two to four personnel depending on the size and scope of the exercise and HN sensitivity. A USDAO representative may also be requested to join the team. Component commands will be prepared to provide officers who are knowledgeable of the activity being inspected, including its participants, the deployment and redeployment schedule, and all details which would be given in an exercise notification. The liaison team may provide a briefing to escorts and inspectors based on this information. Component commands will send names and passport information on their representative(s) to OSIA-E. In countries where known problems exist, arrangements should be made for consultative meetings between liaison personnel and HN military representatives in advance of scheduled exercise activities. The importance of the USDAO role in representing USG interests in this matter cannot be overemphasized. Additional guidance for USDAOs concerning the liaison duty follows:

(a) Experience has shown that the liaison effort may require up to two USDAO representatives participating with the liaison team. This requirement will be coordinated between OSIA and the appropriate USDAO in advance or, at the latest, when news of an inspection challenge is received.

(b) USDAO representatives who will act as liaison officers must become familiar with the VDOC 92, U.S. military activity, exercise participants, and sensitive points, but their

primary contribution will be familiarity with HN points of contact through which the liaison team can work to accomplish its mission. USDAO representatives will also be counted on for HN language capability.

(c) USDAO representatives should expect to live in the field with U.S. forces, should this be required. The uniform for liaison work will be the battle dress uniform (BDU), or equivalent utility uniform, with soft cap.

(d) Requirements to relay messages or requests for assistance, such as hotel reservations for liaison team members, may be passed to the USDAO.

(e) In countries where the U.S. Defense Representative is not the USDAO, the USDAO will keep the U. S. Defense Representative fully apprised of all aspects of CSBM verification actions.

c. USDAO Bonn: Close coordination between FMOD, HQ USEUCOM, and OSIA-E has resulted in arrangements which are mutually satisfactory and normally will not require USDAO involvement.

d. In the event an inspection occurs, the liaison team will establish communications with U.S. forces in the specified area as soon as possible, through the appropriate component command. The affected component command will identify a point of contact with 24-hour telephone access for coordination with the liaison team and will provide this information to HQ USEUCOM and OSIA as soon as the inspection notice is received. Internal exercise planning should routinely include this information as well.

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Annex I

Appendix F (Liaison Team)

VDOC 92 Liaison Team Memorandum of Instruction

Following are the instructions under which USEUCOM members of the U.S. Liaison Team operate during CSCE/VDOC 92 inspections on Allied territory when U.S. forces are in the inspected area.

MEMORANDUM FOR USEUCOM MEMBERS OF OSIA VDOC 92 LIAISON TEAM

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Instruction

1. Duty on a VDOC 92 liaison mission is an interesting and often difficult task. The fact that you are working with allies on

their sovereign territory makes the task complicated and requires that you be sensitive to Allied sovereignty and prerogatives. As a liaison officer, you represent the United States Government.

2. Mission: You will assist OSIA in providing guidance to U.S. forces in the specified inspection area concerning compliance with the VDOC 92. Under the direction of the OSIA team chief, you will establish liaison with host nation officials, provide data on sensitive points and restricted areas such as U.S. installations and activities, and otherwise assist as requested.

3. Execution: You will safeguard U.S. interests and facilitate execution of U.S. obligations incurred under the VDOC 92, by advising U.S. commanders of appropriate or required actions, by providing information to host country escorts concerning U.S. sensitive points or restricted areas, and by providing other assistance as requested. If necessary, or at the initiative of host country escorts, you may communicate directly with inspectors when they inspect U.S. activities, areas, or units.

a. Liaison team will be sensitive to host nation sovereignty and prerogatives. It is U.S. policy that, while the host state receives the inspection, all participating forces are the subject of an inspection (paragraph (87)) and, as a participating state, the U.S. has obligations regarding the inspection (paragraph (98)). It is important that you establish communications with host nation escorts as soon as possible after your arrival in order to coordinate with them, to re-emphasize the limited nature of your mission, and to lay the ground work for accomplishing that mission. Be tactful and diplomatic. You will assist OSIA by establishing communications with HQ USEUCOM as required and coordinating USEUCOM component command assistance or support as necessary.

b. While you may respond to any inspector questions, direct contact with inspectors will be initiated only after coordination with the host nation escort officers.

c. OSIA will provide you with cameras and dictaphones, if necessary, to record events that may arise in dispute and to facilitate preparation of the after action report. Do not use cameras excessively, keeping in mind that both inspectors and hosts may be sensitive to your presence. The team will submit a report which documents any disputes or problem areas arising between inspectors, escorts, and U.S. forces.

d. As the liaison team is a U.S. responsibility, all support will be arranged through U.S. channels, i.e., through HQ USEUCOM and the local USDAO. NATO channels will not be used. If the host nation chooses to include the U.S. liaison team with their escort group, including providing sleeping accommodations and meals, for example, these arrangements should be accepted in the interests of facilitating the team mission. The team members should pay for these arrangements. If the host nation refuses

such payment, team members may accept host nation support (food, lodging, and travel). If host nation support exceeds a maximum fair market value of \$200 per team member, the OSIA team chief will file the report shown at Annex III, Appendix F. This consolidated report shall be completed within fifteen days after completion of the mission and filed with HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECLA, copy provided ECJ5-F. If the host nation escorts do not offer such arrangements, the OSIA team chief will coordinate the approach to be taken to ensure the team knows the inspecting group's movements.

e. In some situations, the liaison team may not be permitted to join the inspecting group, and host nation escorts may not communicate with the liaison team. In such circumstances, the liaison team must be very sensitive to host nation prerogative; the best approach may be to advise the senior U.S. commander of his responsibilities, suggest, if necessary, that your guidance be disseminated through the chain of command, and locate the team so the members stand the best chance of being present at contacts between inspectors and U.S. forces.

f. If the team is not with the escort group, it is best to collocate with U.S. forces where you can be easily contacted. In unusual cases, accommodations may have to be sought at a nearby hotel, rather than with U.S. forces. The OSIA team chief will decide how to position you as liaison team members with U.S. forces. Do not attempt to follow the inspection team group if you are not welcomed officially as part of it.

g. Unit commanders will inform the liaison team of sensitive points/areas. The OSIA team/sub-team chief will inform the inspectors of access denial as necessary. Liaison officers should advise commanders to keep the declaration of sensitive points or restricted areas to a minimum, but should do so whenever classified or sensitive activity or locations require such protection. Sensitive points, particularly the presence of those which may be mobile (command posts, for example), should be made known to host nation officials before the start of the inspection to reduce the number of unknown variables. U.S. liaison personnel will work closely with host state escorts to provide maximum necessary protection for classified or sensitive activities, facilities, or information.

h. U.S. commanders and troops will defer to you in most instances because of your expert knowledge on the VDOC 92 and your experience with its implementation. Keep in mind, however, that your authority is limited, and you will have to resolve challenges through coordination with unit commanders, OSIA, and HQ USEUCOM.

4. Summary: Be tactful and diplomatic. Defer to host nation officials whenever appropriate. Keep a low profile. Establish and maintain communications with OSIA-E and HQ USEUCOM.

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Annex II

Appendix F (Liaison Team)

Guidance for Commanders and Soldiers Who Meet Vienna Document 1992 Inspectors/Evaluators/Observers

1. The purpose of this appendix is to provide easily disseminated guidance to U.S. commanders and soldiers, marines, airmen, or sailors who come in contact with Vienna Document 1992 inspectors/evaluators/observers. It is applicable to all U.S. forces personnel assigned to or operating in the European theater.
2. Only escorted inspectors/evaluators/observers have authority to visit U.S. units. The escort party will normally include U.S. personnel, but may have only Allied officers.
3. The U.S. will meet all international obligations imposed by the Vienna Document 1992. In addition to meeting the letter of the agreement, the U.S. position is to live up to the spirit of the Vienna Document 1992 as well. As hosts or co-hosts to inspectors or observers, we should be as friendly, polite, and open as possible.
4. The following guidelines apply:
 - a. Answer the inspectors/evaluators/observers' questions, but stick to the questions asked. Do not attempt to answer questions to which you don't know the answer. Simply say, "I do not know, sir."
 - b. Show correct military bearing and behavior. Exchange salutes. Address the inspectors as "sir" or "ma'am", as appropriate.
 - c. Feel free to discuss your job or equipment within the scope of your expertise, while avoiding classified or sensitive information.
 - d. All information provided must be unclassified. If asked questions which would require classified responses, simply tell the inspector the information is classified and you are not permitted to discuss the subject. Do not lie or appear to be evasive. Do not attempt to deceive the visitor or pass "dis-information."
 - e. You may discuss unclassified subjects the inspectors or observers ask you about. You may discuss the number of personnel your unit has in the field and the unit authorized strength, but IAW the VDOC 92, you are not obliged to provide the current assigned unit strength.

f. You may answer personal questions to the extent you feel comfortable, including your name, rank, military specialty, home town, basic duties (unclassified), and so forth. Feel free to respond to personal questions about yourself, however, avoid answering questions about other personnel. If asked, identify the unit to which you are assigned.

g. You may acknowledge that electronic warfare is integrated into the exercise play but do not discuss details.

h. You may discuss unclassified aspects of your weapon/equipment capabilities. For example, you may state your howitzer is of a type capable of firing nuclear projectiles, but may not identify your unit as nuclear capable.

i. You may indicate the total number of troops participating in the exercise from each nation.

j. You may indicate the number and type of divisions/air wings participating.

k. You may indicate the number of tanks, antitank guided missile launchers mounted on armored vehicles, number of artillery pieces over 100mm caliber, total number of helicopters by category, and number of sorties by fixed wing aircraft.

l. You may discuss the purpose of air missions and any naval ship-to-shore gunfire supporting the activity.

m. You may discuss the level of command organizing the forces, including the level for supporting air and naval activity.

n. Do not hesitate to ask the U.S. or allied escorts for assistance in deciding the information you may provide.

5. In summary, limit your answers to the questions asked. Do not lie or evade the questions; if you do not know the answer, say so. If the subject is classified, say so. Your forthright cooperation in providing unclassified answers to the questions will assist the USG to live up to the letter and spirit of the Vienna Document 1992.

Annex III

Appendix F (Liaison Team)

Sample Report of Acceptance of Host Nation Support

FROM: OSIA Team Chief

DATE:

SUBJECT: Report of Acceptance of Host Nation Support

TO: HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: ECLA

1. The following host nation support was accepted during the CSBM/VDOC 92 inspection(s)/evaluation(s) identified below:

- a. Inspection/Evaluation Site(s):
- b. Host Nation Providing Support:
- c. Nature of Support Received:
(E.g., three days food at [lodging], four nights lodging at [identify facility], and local transportation to and from inspection site(s).)
- d. Persons Receiving Support:
(Identify by name the U.S. personnel who received support in excess of \$200 per person.)
- e. Circumstances Under Which Support Was Accepted:
(Explain what efforts were made to pay for support and why you were unable to pay for it. Include any information that would indicate acceptance of the support was the best course of action under the circumstances.)
- f. Estimated Total Value of Support Received per Team Member:
(E.g., each member listed in paragraph d. above received approximately \$275 in support during this inspection/visit.)

2. If you require additional information, please contact _____ at _____(phone number_____.

OSIA Team Chief's Signature Block

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Appendix G

Glossary

AIFV	armored infantry fighting vehicle
ACE	Allied Command, Europe
ACV	armored combat vehicle

AIRCENT	Air Forces Central
AIRSOUTH	Air Forces South
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMEMBASSY	American Embassy
APC	armored personnel carrier
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
ATGM	antitank guided missile
ATTU	Atlantic-to-the-Ural(s) (Mountains)
BAI	battlefield air interdiction
BDU	battle dress uniform
CAATS	Conventional Arms Asset Tracking System
CDE	Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CDO	Command Duty Officer (HQ USEUCOM)
CEGE	Combat Equipment Group, Europe
CEOI	Communications-Electronics Operations Instructions
CFE	(Negotiations on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (treaty)
CINCUSAFE	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe
COMMON	Commander, Norway North
CONUS	continental United States
CPCCC	Crisis Prevention Center Consultative Committee
CPX	command post exercise
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DM/NS	Data Management and Notification System
DPSS	designated permanent storage site
DSN	Defense Switch Network
ECJ2	Intelligence Directorate, J2, HQ USEUCOM
ECJ3	Operations Directorate (J-3), HQ USEUCOM
ECJ3-CCD	Command and Control Division, J3, HQ USEUCOM
ECJ3-FO	Flight Operations, ECJ3, HQ USEUCOM
ECJ5	Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), HQ USEUCOM
ECJ4	Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate (J4), HQ USEUCOM
ECJ5-F	Forces and Arms Control Division, ECJ5, HQ USEUCOM
ECLA	Legal Advisor, HQ USEUCOM
ECPA	Public Affairs, HQ USEUCOM
FM	frequency modulation
FMFEUR	Fleet Marine Force, Europe
FMOD	Federal Ministry (Minister) of Defense (Germany)
FR	French Republic
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FTX	field training exercise
HACV	heavy armored combat vehicle

HN	host nation
ITSS	Intratheater Treaty Support System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff)
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MILAIR	Military Air
MOD	Ministry (or Minister) of Defense
NAL	Norway Air-Landed
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NL	Kingdom of the Netherlands
NMCS	National Military Command System
NLT	not later than
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPSEC	operational security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OSIA-E	On-Site Inspection Agency-Europe
POET	protocol on existing types (CFE Treaty)
POM	program objective memorandum
POMCUS	Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
PSC	Primary Subordinate Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SIMA	see USASIMA below
TBD	to be determined
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
USASIMA	U.S. Army Systems Information and Management Activity
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attache Office
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USDR	U.S. Defense Representative
USG	U.S. Government
USIS	U.S. Information Service
USLANTCOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USNAVEUR	U.S. Navy, Europe
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator
VDOC	Vienna Document (1990 or 1992)

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ED 55-5

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A-1

ED 55-5

ED 55-5

B-2

B-3

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